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Challenges to Fragile Democracies in the

Americas: Legitimacy and Accountability
SYMPOSIUM TRANSCRIPT

EDITOR'S NOTE

On February 25, 2000, the University of Texas School of Law hosted an extraordinary
gathering to discuss the fragility of democracies in Latin America and the dangers that they
face. The event was sponsored by several institutions at the University of Texas: the School
of Law, the Institute of Latin American Studies, the Office of the Provost, the College of
Liberal Arts Democracy in the Third Millennium Program, and the International Law
Society at the School of Law.
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I1.
A.

WELCOMING REMARKS AND INTRODUCTION

Welcoming Remarks by Dean Michael Sharlot

Given the reputation of Yankees for being time-ridden and controlled by the clock, I
feel obliged as the dean to open the first session. My name is Michael Sharlot. I am the
Dean of the University of Texas School of Law. I know that it is improper to open with an
apology, but I always feel embarrassed by being one of the vast majority of Americans who
are congenitally monolingual, so please forgive me. It is my pleasure and honor to welcome
you here today on behalf of the law school community. This is a small provincial law
school, but it has been blessed by loyal alumni, a fine facility, and a faculty that generates an
admirable level of intellectual action. I hope before you leave us you will take a tour of the
building and, particularly, our most beautiful library and its Latin American collection.
I do want to wish you good fortune and progress with respect to the issues that you
will be examining. You have certainly brought together distinguished participants whose
knowledge and wisdom should help guide your feet through these difficult paths. I say
difficult because, although I am not an expert in this area, at a much earlier stage in my
career, I was involved in a major American effort to seek to transplant some of our values to
other nations, and one of the things that I learned about that effort was considerable caution.
There is an enormous temptation to lecture others on how to organize government or
how to codify rules. This temptation is very difficult for us to overcome, whether as
individuals or as members of a particular society. And we often forget that the rules and
governmental forms that are familiar to us came about over generations of struggle and
experience. Moreover, the process in the United States that brought about our distinctive
system of government was blessed in a number of ways that not all nations have enjoyed.
Largely, it took place in an era of internal peace, except for the paroxysm of our Civil War.
We were also blessed by being largely isolated from pressures of other nations and with a
bounty provided by the country that was able to be exploited at an early stage by our people.
And that ability to exploit our country and its riches meant that we were able to generate the
surplus wealth that allows us-allows any nation-to generate the kinds of social controls
that ensure internal peace, which is essential to economic and political freedom.
I sometimes wonder what the course of the building of the United States would have
been if it had emerged at a time when the International Monetary Fund (ZIf), the Vorld
Trade Organization (VTO), and the pressures of the globalization of the world economy
had been extant

But in short, I urge a suitable humility on my fellow citizens who are going to
participate in such events and an appropriate skepticism on the part of our colleagues from
abroad. In evaluating proposals based on such different histories, I personally cannot
imagine anything more important for any society than to seek legal arrangements that offer
minimum levels of security for the person and property of each citizen-security against not
only the depredations of other citizens, but as important or perhaps more importantly,
against the aggression of the state. I wonder whether it is possible for each of the emerging
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nations of the world to find its own way and consider the experiences of Westminster or
Washington, D.C. as merely examples of a particular society's course towards development.
Finally, at the risk of revealing myself as a terrible ameliorist, I confess to favor steps
that, although small, will achieve some modicum of security for citizens as opposed to
eloquent and ringing endorsements of the most expansive notions of rights. My concern is
always that we not seek to embody in our governmental documents guarantees that will be
ignored by those in positions of power because guarantees that are ignored, I think, breed
the worst kind of cynicism on the part of both ordinary citizens and those who govern.
I now have the honor of turning your meeting over to Dr. Nicolas Shumway, a
distinguished scholar and administrator. Dr. Shumway is the Director of the Institute of
Latin American Studies and holds the Thomas Rivera Professorship in Spanish Language
and Literature. The University of Texas was extraordinarily fortunate in luring Dr.
Shumway from Yale. He has been instrumental in vitalizing the Institute of Latin American
Studies and in making further progress in this university's very deep, very real commitment
of seeking cooperative efforts with colleagues throughout the rest of the Americas.
B.

Introduction by Dr.Nicolas Shumway

Thank you Dean Sharlot for those very generous remarks. It is a pleasure to be here.
It occurs to me that I may be the only person here who is not a law student or a lawyer. So
if I make any legal blunders, please attribute them to ignorance.
I would like to use something Dean Sharlot said as a point of departure. Frequently
when we talk about democracy, we somehow think, particularly in this country, that
democracy begins with the Greeks and then somehow, by direct lineage, arrives at the
Philadelphia constitutional convention of 1788. This ignores the fact that discussions about
democracy follow many lines of development, including a fascinating tradition in Latin
America.
I would therefore like to refer briefly to some people who have talked about
democracy in Latin America and look at some of the conclusions they arrived at. The first
is Sim6n Bolivar, a man often called the Liberator because of his courageous military
campaigns that freed much of South America from Spanish rule. But Bolivar was also a
thinker, a reader, and a persuasive writer. After his early successes in the wars of
independence, Bolivar met a temporary setback and in 1812 was forced to seek exile in
Jamaica, a British possession that unofficially sympathized with the independence struggle.
While there, he wrote a very thoughtful letter titled "A Letter to a Jamaican Gentleman,"
which became recognized as one of the founding documents of Latin American political
thought. In this letter, Bolivar talked about democratic institutions and sentiment, although
the word he preferred to democracy was federalism, a word more appropriate for that time.
Bolivar argued that Spanish colonial rule had left the Spanish colonies unprepared for
democratic rule by not allowing the Creoles, that is, colonials born in America, to learn the
basics of self-government. He made explicit reference to the United States, admiring on the
one hand the success of the North Americans, while on the other cautioning that the peoples
of Latin America had not yet attained the civic virtues to replicate the United States system.
To compensate for this lack of experience, Bolivar came up with several interesting
proposals. He first said that the constituent conventions should create an office of life-long
president (presidente vitalicio). This president would be appointed by the constituent
convention-not elected by the people-and would serve until his death. In a famous letter
he returned to this point by arguing that Spanish American countries needed "kings with the
name of president" (reyes con el nombre depresidente). Bolivar also proposed that the new
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Spanish American nations create a hereditary senate, something like the House of Lords,
whose first members would also be appointed by the constituent conventions. Only the
second legislative house members would serve limited terms and be elected by the people
on a regular basis. Underlying Bolivar's ideas was a profound suspicion of the masses.
Similar misgivings led the United States' founding fathers to create the electoral college.
Bolivar's ideas are interesting in their own right, of course. But they take on particular
interest when we see Hugo Chdvez, newly elected populist leader of Venezuela, claiming
that he is really Bolivarian. I am not sure what part of Bolivar's thinking he is talking about.
I hope he isn't reviving the idea of the presidente vitalicio.
Basic to Bolivar's concerns is the question of what distinguishes a sovereign, selfgoverning people from the mob-a question much debated throughout nineteenth-century
Latin America. In Mexico, people like Jos6 Maria Luis Mor feared that giving the people
too much power might open the door to populist rowdies like Santa Ana, and-of coursein Mexico's case he was right. In Argentina, Esteban Echeverria made a similar point when
he argued that the people can govern themselves "only when they become a people." In
short, Echeverria did not see "the people" as the result of some inherent right, but as an
entity to be formed through experience and proper education. This discussion on what
constitutes a people is something that occurred throughout the nineteenth century. In
Mexico, we had people like Jos6 Maria Luis Mor who developed the fact that if we give
the people too much power, they are likely to elect someone like Santa Ana, so we have to
somehow limit the power of the people, so that they will make correct decisions. In
Argentina, Esteban Echevarria made a very telling point. He said, "Yes, the people can
govern themselves when they become a People." In this sense, it is very interesting to see
how he used capitalization, when the people with a small "p" become a People with a large
"P." Until that happens, he said, you really cannot trust democracy.
An even more significant person in this debate is Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, also
an Argentine and arguably the most gifted and influential Latin American writer of the
nineteenth century. He defended the notion of government by the people but later clarified
that when he said "people" he was not talking about blacks, Indians, or even gauchos.
Rather, he was talking about the decent people, people who are educated and know how to
dress. (He worried a great deal about proper dress, manners, and appearance.) Curiously,
in his lexicon democracy was simultaneously an ideal and something to be feared.
Other Latin American leaders came up with radically different ideas about the
meaning of democracy and equality under the law-ideas that usually lead us to not think of
them as democratic at all. One whom I find particularly interesting is a man named Dr.
Melchor de Francia, who governed Paraguay as a dictator for nearly thirty years and
relinquished rule only on his death in 1840. Although much vilified by his liberal
contemporaries, Dr. Francia considered himself a man of the Enlightenment and a defender
of modem notions of government. However, he did not accept traditional liberal notions of
freedom of thought, religious belief, and expression; rather, he believed that the first task of
democracy was economic equality. Consequently, much of his rule wvas devoted to seeking
the material well-being of his citizens. He came up with a novel scheme by which all land
would be owned by the government and then leased for life according to the needs of the
tenants. The tenants could develop the land and prosper according to their efforts, but they
could not sell the land nor could they leave it to their heirs. Francia thus prevented the
accumulation of large tracts of land by single owners, while allowing everyone a way of
supporting himself and his family. As a result, Paraguay became one of the most prosperous
countries in Latin America in the first half of the 1800s. And it was the only country in the
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early period of independence history that actually grew in population. A lot of poor people
immigrated to Paraguay because they knew they could have land there.
A mulatto who had felt the sting of racial discrimination, Francia also believed that
white people sharing countries with people of other races and race mixtures would never
consent to democracy. His solution: obliterate the white race. While other Latin American
countries in the nineteenth century hoped to whiten their countries by attracting European
immigrants, Francia wanted to darken his by encouraging mixed marriages. He actually
forbade marriage between white people. If a white man wanted to get married, he would
say, "Well, that is a wonderful idea. I have a lovely little mulata over here who would make
a wonderful wife." He even forbade the custom of allowing white people to choose white
godparents for their children. His goal was to create an American race, and for him that
race would be mixed. Francia was also capable of being exceptionally cruel with people
who disagreed with him. His enemies either entered exile, served long prison terms, or were
killed. His was not a society in which many of us would have survived, much less felt
comfortable. Yet, in his own mind, Francia saw himself as democratic because democracy
for him was enforced equality.
Another interesting idea in the debates about democracy in Latin America involves the
figure of the caudillo, an old medieval term for a kind of mythical person who somehow is
the incarnation of the will of the people. It is very interesting that caudillo almost becomes
a kind of mystical apostolate. This caudillo quality makes them more authentic
spokespeople for the people than some sort of legal system that we might create as a
democracy. In some sense, the prototype of the caudillo is Juan Manuel de Rosas, the
dictator who dominated Argentine politics from 1829 to 1852. Yet, curiously, not everyone
sees Rosas as anti-democratic. As a young man, Juan Bautista Alberdi, one of Argentina's
greatest nineteenth-century political thinkers, once argued that even though Rosas did not
govern through the usual mechanisms of constitutional democracy, he represented a kind of
organic democracy in that he spoke for the people through an intuition that was his by virtue
of being an authentic caudillo, a man with a quasi-mystical gift for hearing and articulating
the will of the people. Even Sarmiento, who despised Rosas with admirable eloquence, had
to confess that in many ways Rosas was exactly the kind of leader many Argentines wanted.
Sarmiento's ambitious social program for Argentina consisted not only of eliminating
Rosas; he also wanted to change the social fabric of Argentina so radically that a Rosas
would never again be possible. Such was a powerful reason behind Sarmiento's untiring
support of immigration from Europe and public education. These were mechanisms through
which he wanted to create a new Argentine people.
Still, the idea of the caudillo being the authentic representative of the people, and
therefore a necessary figure in Latin American democracy, does not go away. When Hugo
Chdvez blithely destroys Venezuelan institutions while claiming to speak for the people
(and convincing many Venezuelans of the same), he sounds like an old-time caudillo. Even
more telling in this regard is Che Guevara's defense of Fidel Castro in his essay Socialism
and Man in Cuba, where he very clearly argues that Cuba need not institute the mechanisms
of what he dismisses as "bourgeois democracy" because Cuba has in Fidel an authentic
spokesperson of the people. Just like Rosas. Just like Per6n. And perhaps just like
Chdvez-although in this case it is probably too early to tell.
So when we get into the discussion of this conference about fragile democracies in
Latin America, let's realize that there is a cultural and historical context here that is
enormously complicated and that North Americans must not disregard. Further, we must
avoid thinking that we have a fool-proof, add-water-and-stir recipe for democracy, and even
more, we need to eschew any notion that democratic nirvana has been created in the United
States. Dr. Francia might seem absolutely crazy when he talks about white people being an
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obstacle to democracy. And he might have a point. He might also be unmodern, utopian,
and just not with the program when he says democracy must begin with economic equality.
On the other hand, can we really talk about a viable democracy in countries where the
majority of the people have no economic stake in the system?
Fortunately, since I am not a lawyer, I am by definition not smart enough to find ways
to solve the problems addressed by this conference. But I would hope that the discussions
we hear today can at least be informed by cultural context and historical weight. In the
meantime, I plan to find a nice seat outside of the panelists' sight line and enjoy the
conference.
fI.

A.

PANEL ONE: PRESIDENTIAL-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS:
CONFRONTATION OR COORDINATION?

Statement ofProfessorLourdes FloresNano

I will try to share with you some of the recent experiences on the Peruvian political
process and the relationship between the executive branch and the legislative branch, which
is the main issue of this panel. In concise terms, I would have to say that we are speaking of
fragile democracies, and Peruvian democracy has never been terribly strong. It has suffered
a lot of difficulties during the Republican era. Although we have had 170 years of
independence, we have had probably sixty years of real democratic governments and 110 of
military interruptions. But what I am going to focus on right now is the present situation
that actually started in 1990 when Peru elected a new president, Alberto Fujimori. But the
political system has changed radically since April 5, 1992, when the elected president
staged an auto golpe de estado (coup d'etat), which means he closed the Congress. He
removed the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court members, and a new attack on his
own elected government began. That democratic break was based on two important ideas.
First, there was a claim of order to defeat the worst social problem we had at that
time-terrorism. The Shining Path was dominating an important part of our territory. One
of the basic ideas was that we needed this political break because we needed absolute
control to defeat terrorists; formal institutions and difficulties that we have cannot be
avoided if we do not have a very strong government guiding this process. The other idea
was that there had been, since the first two years of this government (1990 to 1992), a lot of
conflict between the executive branch and the Congress. So the two basic ideas for this
democratic interruption were the need for order to defeat terrorism and to eliminate this set
of conflicts.
I always maintained that a cool and calm balance would let us know that, contrary to
what was said and even though Fujimori did not have a majority of the Congress, his
reforms, both the economic and the classification rules, were supported by the Congress.
They were also supported-at the time I was a member of the Congress, as I am right
now-by those of us who did not support him in the election. Those of us who were part of
paragaciosasgroup, as we believed in an open market economy, a free economy, supported
his reforms, even though we were of the "other" position. On the classification rules, we
had a very interesting discussion with the Prime Minister of that time, and we agreed on
some rules. But even though it was-or because it was, as I would say afterwnrds-a more
sophisticated military plan, the idea was not to have any sort of control based on the idea
that we did not need it.
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The other thing was that conflicts between the Congress and the executive branch were
not real. Of course there were conflicts, as in all political situations, but you could not say
that it was the Congress that threw out all the ministers or disturbed his government. In only
two years, one minister was censured; whereas, for example, in the first administration of
President Fujimori, one minister was censured every two months. So the so-called conflicts
were not as hard or as difficult as they were reported to be.
The real reason behind Fujimori's coup d'etat was a military long-term plan called the
Green Plan. The idea to obtain order and develop the country was impossible with
politicians guiding the process. You needed long-term vision, and you needed the armed
forces as guardians of the process. That is something that is called a democracy under
control (democracia vigilada) or democracy under the vision of the institution that could
guarantee a sort of long-term vision. Reelection was a stop along the path. The reelection
of President Fujimori in violation of the Constitution, by the government that was then
ruling, led to order, which then led to the achievement of such a long-term project. That
was the main idea and the real reason for this democratic break.
There was international pressure, and new elections were called ten months after that.
So, in late 1992 and the first month of 1993, there was a new Congress. A Constitutional
Congress was elected, and Fujimori won the majority. The majority that he did not have
from 1990 to 1992, he got in December 1992 after the coup d'etat. Since then several
things have happened.
First, the democratic interruption was legitimized. People who had strongly supported
the coup d'etat wanted the Congress out of office. People shouted to them on the streets,
"Get out! You are lazy. Get out!" About eighty percent of the people supported the coup
d'etat; after the elections, people were legitimizing that interruption. Second, Congress had
an absolute majority. That meant zero conflict and no checks and balances. Third,
constitutional reform was led by one main objective: establishing free reelection. The 1979
Constitution-the one under which Fujimori was elected-said that he could not run for
office again. He had to leave office for one term, and only then could he run again.
Congress changed the Constitution allowing Fujimori to run one more time.
Finally, reinforcing the idea that there were no real checks and balances, there were
external pressures. Here I mean that external official organisms, especially the armed
forces, had always perceived this process as a democracy with formal institutions-as a
democracy under control. There were many incidents where we see how the armed forces
were really watching and visualizing this democracy with control. For example, there were
some issues on human rights. There was the murder of nine students and a professor at the
University at Lima. That crime was certainly something that involved high officials; there
were tanks in the streets when the investigation began. Finally, that process ended with an
amnesty law.
So it was a democracy and a control. That is the basic idea I am trying to establish.
Anyway, that process lasted from 1993 to 1995. The coup d'etat was on April 5, 1992, and
the new elections were later in 1992. With the new Constitution, Fujimori ran for reelection
and won.
Once again, he obtained a majority in the Congress. From 1996 to 1999, one main
purpose guided the activity of Congress activity: build the institutional framework for a new
reelection. Remember, I told you that they said the previous legal order, the former
Constitution, the former Congress, and the former judiciary were all obstacles to the defeat
of terrorism. They needed total control, and they got it. They got a popular legitimization
of the order they had given, and they wrote and approved a new Constitution, which
established one more possibility. But they did not want that. They were thinking of that
long-term project. And, of course, with the former Constitution that they wrote, which was
written after the coup d'etat, the new legal order was a democratic form of order with some
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controls, with the judiciary, some independence, and the Constitutional Court-they threw it
out. They threw out the order that they had given because they thought this was the next
step in the process, and that the process needed institutions to grow over time. That was an
ideal situation. They had done it, but it was ideal.

It did not have to do with the real

concrete situation of who-even though terrorism was completely defeated and they were
re-guiding the country to the ideas they have. From 1996 to 1999 there was one main issue:
How are we supposed to build the framework that will permit the continuing of this longterm military and civil project?
The single most important element of the Peruvian process is that this framework is
often built on unconstitutional issues. This process was wholly built through loss, through
the Congress, and through the formal institutions that they had built. It was not through a
democratic interruption. It was not by avoiding the formal institutions. It was done
basically using the Congress and the law. It was, from my point of view, the destruction of
the rule of law through the law.
When a university is trying to understand what the peculiar characteristics of fragile
democracies are, I would say that the Peruvian case shows how you can use the law, the
Congress, and formal democratic institutions to weaken or to destroy the state of law. For
example, let me point out that in 1996, an interpretative law was given. Where the
Constitution had said Fujimori could not run, the Congress said he could run for two
periods. Let us start from the new Constitution. He has served one period; he could run
once more. They named a Constitutional Court, and the Constitutional Court said that
Fujimori could not run. They called for an impeachment (which was absolutely a stupid
thing), and through that impeachment-through a majority vote in the Congress-Fujimori
was impeached. We are right now in International Court. One million five hundred
thousand people fought for a referendum. We got signatures. It was a lot of work and took
two years. The referendum asked for popular participation, a new right that the constitution
had given. When we got one million signatures, they said, "No, it has to pass through the
Congress," and as they had a majority in the Congress, Fujimori's removal was avoided.
The judiciary was leading a reform process. They controlled the judiciary, and
through the judiciary, they got control of the electoral court. When they got control of the
electoral court, they changed the laws in order to be able to have the votes they needed
when Fujimori was presented. Everything in our Senate has been through laws, through the
Congress, with votes that the people had given them in 1995. Of course, Fujimori was
running as a new candidate. Their constitutional rules were not a legal course to eliminating
participation.
What are the lessons of the Peruvian process? I must say there are four. First,
alternative regimes could be built through formal and legal processes. Second,
legitimization of the democratic breaks could mean institutional destruction through the law.
If people vote for a new majority, they say, "Well, we have a majority. We have the
People's acceptance. We can do whatever Ave want." Third, lack of controls strengthen the

executive branch in our democracy. We could create a king, but call him a president
through formal ways. And fourth, and most importantly, there is an enormous need to build
citizenship and political controls in order to avoid this very particular system which allows
for the destruction of the state of law through the law-through formal processes that are
legitimized by a vote.
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Statement of ProfessorCarlosRosenkrantz

Thank you for the invitation to participate in this Symposium. My aspiration this
morning is quite unpretentious. I only want to highlight the importance of nonconstitutional elements-elements not usually enshrined in the Constitution-when we are
called to think on the best constitutional design.
In order to illustrate my talk, I will refer to Argentina. As you may know I was
involved in the process of constitutional reform there. But my biography is not the reason
why I choose Argentina to illustrate my rather limited point. I use Argentina because it
starkly illustrates how a Constitution that is able to function could be absolutely disastrous
in a different set of circumstances.
Let me start by reminding you of the weird predicament of Argentina. My country is a
world example of national failure. In the 1930s Argentina had a great future. All its figures
were very auspicious. Its GNP was the fifth largest in the world. Illiteracy was rare. The
educational system was free and open to all. The distribution of national wealth was quite
egalitarian. We were not disturbed by territorial rivalries, religious cleavages or racial
confrontations. In sum, we had the potential to become a great country. If you look at
Argentina now you will feel dismay. Argentina now is a dual society-France and Haiti
commingled in the same place. It has an economy always at the verge of collapse; its
educational system is unable to produce results; the gap between rich and poor is booming;
corruption is rampant both in the public and private domains; we developed a
confrontational public culture, etc.
There are several hypotheses that try to explain why we failed so dramatically.
Professor Shumway, for instance, offers a cultural explanation. He says that Argentina was
unable to give itself a guiding myth. In his account, Argentina was a society with no
overlapping consensus on what its national identity was and this inability prevented it from
organizing political action effectively. Others locate the source of our national catastrophe
in the presumably authoritarian legacy of our Spanish colonizers and their Latin American
institutions.
Others are more convinced by sociological explanations. For them Argentina failed
because-unlike what happened in other countries of new immigration like New Zealand,
Australia, and Canada-land was unevenly distributed among the population. Since
Argentina was a producer of raw materials, the maldistribution of land created an
insurmountable disfunction in our polity.
Still others, more materialistic, blame the inability of the country to supersede the
model of import substitution implanted during the second world war. These authors claim
that Argentina collapsed because its economy collapsed and this happened because
Argentina was unable to return to the production of raw materials where it had competitive
advantages once the war was over (during the war Argentina had to produce what it needed
by itself because the world was entirely committed to the war effort.)
Each of these hypotheses carries some truth. However, they are dramatically
incomplete. And they are incomplete because they neglect the central role our institutions
have had in our national development. Indeed, our institutional design was the background
cause, the reason why we were unable to create a national myth, to overcome the challenges
of a maldistribution of land, to supersede the model of import substitution and to neutralize
the presumably authoritarian legacy of our colonizers and their Latin American institutions.
The assertion that our institutions are the background cause of our evils requires some
explanation.
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In my understanding it is plausible to think that the two most important virtues of an
institutional design are, on the one hand, efficiency and, on the other hand, control. You
may want to add legitimacy to the list or synthesize these two virtues in the virtue stability
or, finally, you may want to hitch them all to justice. I suggest you resist doing so. First,
legitimacy is better conceived as a complex by-product of efficiency and controlmajoritarian tyranny is majoritarian after all; second, the synthesis in stability, though it
gains in elegance, it loses in explanatory power, and, third, justice is a second-stage virtue.
Justice presupposes political institutions and therefore those virtues that make political
institutions possible.
Let me say here what I mean by efficiency and control. By efficiency, I mean the
possibility of the majority to act upon its political agenda. By control, I mean the possibility
for the minority to prevent the majority from acting upon its political agenda when in doing
so the majority will unjustifiably harm vital interests of the minority.
It is interesting to note in passing that the nature of these two virtues make the crafting
of an institutional design a rather tricky business. To start vth, both virtues are sine qua
non. There is nothing of value in a system that possesses efficiency and no control; and vice
versa, there is nothing of value in a system that possesses control and no efficiency. This is
so for the simple reason that political stability will be impossible when the majority can do
as it pleases-as it happens when there is no control-or when the minority can prevent
majoritarian action at will-as happens when there is no efficiency. To make things even
more complex, these two institutional virtues are antithetical to one another. They point in
different directions. Thus, the maximum of control necessarily entails the minimum of
efficiency, and the maximum of efficiency necessarily entails the minimum of control.
The institutions are the best you can have when they embody to the highest attainable
degree the virtues of efficiency and control. When they do so they provide you everything
you can expect from an institutional design. Therefore, if notwithstanding the realization of
these two virtues the country fails, the institutions should not be blamed for such a failure.
But if they do not provide you with efficiency and control in decent amounts they can be

indicated as the sources of your national breakdown when it happens.
With all the preceding in mind let's go back to the Argentine constitutional structure
and its para-constitutional elements. As most South American countries, Argentina
followed the path inaugurated by the United States. The United States' constitutional
invention had a fascinating influence on our founding fathers. It is true, as Professor
Shunmway suggested today, that we deviated substantially from the way in which the
presidency is regulated by the United States Constitution (our presidents, with the exception
of the Chilean president in the pre-1925 constitutions, were more powerful). But
notwithstanding this deviation our institutional systems looked pretty much like the United
States. Argentina-and for that matter all the big countries of the subcontinent (that is
Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela up to its recent constitutional convention)-are presidential
federations with bicameral congresses with both houses having the same constitutional role
in the process of law making; they are symmetrical.
Many people think the question of whether we could blame our institutional structure
for our national failure depends on whether Presidentialism is a good institutional
arrangement-good in terms of efficiency and control. They say that Presidentialism cannot
be bad since it is the regimen of one of the most efficient and controlled systems in the
world.
I have no doubts that a presidential system can realize both virtues up to a
considerable degree and, therefore, Presidentialism is not necessarily doomed to fail. I also

TExAs INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

(VOL. 36:319

agree that the presidential system of the United States is a living example of this possibility.
Here the president is a catalytic factor of the political agenda of the majority; Congress, by

contrast, where minorities can be represented, usually plays the role of the controller of the
action of the president. Consequently, if something went wrong with Argentina, it was not
its constitutional structure which, as I said previously, is pretty much the same as that of the
United States.
Instead, the problem in Argentina was the way in which its constitutional design fit
with its para-constitutional elements, that is, the way in which our Presidentialism fit with
our social and political realities-the structure of our parties, the nature of our electoral
laws, and the dynamic of our political life. Let me say in passing that the interplay between
constitutional structure and para-constitutional elements was not only ignored by our
framers but also by most of our constitutional commentators before Carlos Nino insisted
upon this point in the mid-1980s.
Indeed, the success of the political project of the United States was not only a
consequence of the way in which the U.S. Constitution regulated the relationship between
the President and Congress, as most constitutional lawyers seem to think in Argentina, In
addition, the success of the United States as a polity crucially depended on some nonconstitutional elements of the institutional system, more precisely, the plurality of its
electoral laws, the relative looseness of party discipline, and the consensual nature of its
political life.
It is the conjunction of constitutional design and para-constitutional elements that
made Argentina different from the United States.
During most of our contemporary history (1940s on) we had two parties-the Radical
Party and the Peronist Party-competing with chances for the presidential seat and for
control in Congress. The President was always elected by popular vote (sometimes
indirectly though) and members of the lower house of Congress were elected by
proportional representation. In addition, small provincial districts-in the majority
Peronist-enjoyed over-representation in the House and, then in the Senate-which was
elected by provincial legislatures. Finally, party discipline was very strong such that
members of Congress could only dissent with their Party in important issues only by
breaking apart (something really unlikely given that the absence of open primaries made the
parties the gatekeepers of the Party tickets.).
Everything I just mentioned, which was not in the Constitution, produced two iron
laws of Argentine Presidentialism.
Fist law: When a Peronist is elected as president, there is no control. This was always
so because a Peronist President always meant a Peronist Congress. Indeed, the overrepresentation in the lower house of Congress of small districts controlled by the Peronists,
plus the numbers of votes the Peronists must have had to elect a Peronist President, always
provided a Peronist majority of the seats in the lower house of Congress. The Senate, due to
the control of small districts by the Peronists, was always Peronist too. Finally the rigid
party discipline implied the inexistence of control. In short, with a Peronist President, a
Peronist political agenda would acquire the status of valid law notwithstanding the intensity
of the opposition by minorities to such political agenda.
Second law: When a Radical is elected as president, there is no efficiency. For a
Radical President it was impossible to have its political agenda converted into valid law
without the support of the Peronists (remember that the Peronists controlled the Senate and
were a over-represented in the lower house). But, given the rigid party discipline, the
Peronists never supported a Radical President (or at least they never supported the Radical
President in crucial votes). Contrary to what happened under a Peronist President, under a
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Radical President the majority will not have its political agenda converted into valid law
whatever the intensity of the support for this political agenda.
Obviously, a culture of political cooperation could have falsified these two laws. Ifwe
were people willing to cooperate with one another for the public good we, as a citizenry,
would have required political parties to accommodate in functional ways. But a political
culture of political accommodation is a consequence-and not a cause-of political
institutions and Presidentialism is a system that does not foster such a culture of political
accommodation. Given the winner-take-all nature of a presidential system (if you lose by
one vote you get nothing) it is always better to try to block the government, hoping to
displace it in the next presidential election, than to cooperate with it, since whatever your
degree of cooperation, you are not going to be credited for being cooperative. (The reason
why a culture of political accommodation was possible in the United States, in my
understanding, could be explained by the eminently procedural character of the American
revolution-which avoided class, religious and economic confrontation-and by the slow
and gradual increment in participation, which allowed a very peaceful process of inclusion
of different interests in the political process).
I hope that the preceding convinces you that my point is correct and, therefore, that
you will agree with me that non-constitutional elements are of the prime relevance in an
institutional design. If that were the case I could stop here. However, to justify your
presence here in case you were convinced of my point even before I voiced it, let me share
with you what I think were the options for Argentina when in 1994 Argentina decided to
amend its Constitution.
As I said, Argentina's para-constitutional elements suffered from Presidentialism.
Therefore, we had to decide which alternative to Presidentialism was better for us.
A Westminster model was out of the question. To start with, Westminster fits a
federalist country poorly and, given the power majorities enjoy in it, it only works well
when supplemented by a culture of political accommodation.
What about Constrained Parliamentarianism, like the one you could find in Germany
and Spain? Constrained Parliamentarism is characterized by the fact that it is impossible for
Parliament to launch a non-confidence vote of the Prime Minister and his cabinet when
Constrained
Parliament has not already agreed upon someone to replace him.
Parliamentarianism, recently endorsed by Professor Ackerman, is quite interesting. It cures
the endemic instability of Parliamentarianism. In addition, it fits federalism and offers a
high degree of control, since it can coexist with a senate and with a Constitutional Court and
some other controlling agencies. Therefore Constrained Parliamentarianism was a viable
option.
The great problem to implant a Constrained Parliamentarian system in Argentina was
that our para-constitutional elements do not fit with it. Our electoral system, proportional
representation with very low thresholds, is inimical to Parliamentarianism.
Indeed, a Parliamentary system only works well with a small number of political
parties with no great ideological distance between them. If there are many parties
ideologically at the antipodes of one another, the system runs the risk of endless party
confrontation and cyclical instability as has happened in Italy and, to some extent, in France
during the Fourth Republic and in Germany during Weimar.
Therefore, if we opted for Constrained Parliamentarianism, we would have needed to
change our electoral system since proportional representation with very low thresholds is an
invitation for party proliferation which can only be neutralized by the agglutinating effects

TExAs INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 36:319

of the presidential election. But changes in the electoral system were impossible given that
our politicians understood that a change in electoral laws may end up by unseating them.
With the Westminster and Constrained Parliamentarianism models out of the question,
we had two other systems to choose from. Both systems were dual systems or, as Sartori
has said, "double engine mechanisms." These systems, instead of mixing features of
Presidentialism with features of Parliamentarianism in the same system, as semiPresidentialism and semi-Parliamentarianism do, alternate Presidentialism with
Parliamentarianism. There are two ways in which the alternative could proceed.
First, Presidentialism by default. Presidentialism by default works in the following
way: You elect both a President and a Congress. You give Congress the opportunity to
appoint a Prime Minister. If Congress manages to appoint a Prime Minister, the system

vorks as a parliamentary system. If Congress does not agree upon the appointment of a
Prime Minister, the system works as a Presidential system. The idea is that a presidency by
default will act as a threat and it will create the right incentives for the political elite to agree
upon the appointment of a Prime Minister (who could be the President herself). Sartori is
an enthusiastic supporter of this form of government for Latin America.
Presidentialism by default will certainly avoid the risk of deadlocks endemic to
Presidentialism--if there are enough members of Congress against the president they will
most likely agree upon the nomination of a Prime Minister and if there are not enough
members of Congress against the President the President will be able to govem smoothly.
In addition, Presidentialism by default will provide a cure for the endemic political
instability of Parliamentary systems given that each time there is instability-that is to say,
each time Congress can not agree upon the appointment of a government-a President will
take over (the presidency may also work as an incentive for pre-electoral agreements among
different parties). Finally, Congress can work as a powerful controlling device of all the
violations of the rule law by the President.
The second way to alternate Presidentialism with Parlamentarianism is
Parliamentarianism by default. Parliamentarism by default functions in the following way:
You elect a president and a Congress. If the president gets more than fifty percent of the
valid votes, the system works as a presidential system. If the president does not get fifty
percent of the votes, the system works as a Constrained Parliamentarianism, that is as a
parliamentary system that prevents non-confidence votes of the Prime Minister when
Congress has not already agreed upon someone to replace him. Parliamentarianism by
default minimizes the risk of deadlocks since the president enters into the scene only when
she gets more than 50% of the votes which, by virtue of the system of proportional
representation, most certainly implies that her party also got a majority in Congress. In
addition, Parliamentarianism by default most likely cures the instability of parliamentary
systems because the presidency may work as an incentive for pre-electoral agreements
among different parties. Finally, Parliamentarianism by default makes it possible for the
system to generate its own antidotes: Given that she would be highest magistrate, the
president elected by popular vote, it remains possible for the people to circumvent the
congressional establishment and its political arrangements.
In my view, Presidentialism by default is better because it gives the first chance to
Parliamentarianism and therefore makes it more likely that the culture of political
accommodation associated with working Parliamentary systems may emerge. However, I
could also settle with Parliamentarianism by default.
Notwithstanding the interesting features of these dual systems neither of them could
obtain the required consensus. They were far ahead not only of the way politicians thought
about the question, but also and more surprisingly, far ahead of the academics who, unlike
you, did not understand the importance of para-constitutional elements in a constitutional
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design and insisted that since Presidentialism works well in the United States should also
work well in Argentina.
Given the impossibility of dual systems, the Constitutional Convention, inspired to
some extent by France and by Portugal, poured into the Presidential mold some features of
Parliamentarianism and obtained a Premier-Presidentialism
The Constitutional Convention decided that the President be elected by popular
majority, with a run-off in case the candidate with the most votes for the presidency did not
get (a) fifty percent of the valid votes or (b) more than forty-five percent of the valid votes
and ten percent more votes than the candidate with the second most votes. When elected,
the President appoints a Chief of Staff. The President shares some of the power of his office
with the Chief of Staff and some other powers are directly transferred to the Chief of Staff.
The Chief of Staff is subject to a non-confidence vote of both houses of Congress. The
Constitutional Convention also included in the Constitution some agencies controlled by
Congress that will, supposedly, tame presidential power.
The expectation of the Constitutional Convention was that the Premier-Presidentialism
it adopted will implement both control and efficiency. The idea was that when a Radical
President does not enjoy a supporting majority in both houses-the case in which deadlocks
were usual-it will have to compromise with the Peronists because, otherwise, the Peronists
will appoint the Chief of Staff by themselves. In addition, when the Peronists have a
majority in both houses they will find less incentive to block the government since they
could directly appoint the Chief of Staff. In addition, since Premier-Presidentialism
maintains a national election of the President with a run-off it will have the agglutination
effects on political parties all presidential systems have and therefore it will keep the
number of parties somehow controlled.
Obviously, it is too soon to know whether the Constitutional Convention just mixed
things up or provided a careful recipe of a constitutional design. In my understanding the
Constitutional Convention did not go as far as it should have. It was unable to understand
fully the way in which our para-constitutional elements determined our political reality and,
more importantly, had only a limited willingness to put constitutional imagination at the
service of the national cause. As usual we imitated others instead of trying to come out with
idiosyncratic solutions to our rather idiosyncratic problems.
C.

Statement ofProfessorA.R. Brewer-Carias

As a member of the National Constituent Assembly for Venezuela last year, I will
have to refer to our constant progress and our new constitution. I was one of 131 members
of the Assembly, elected as an independent. Only four members were part of the
opposition, so we were truly a minority in the Assembly.
This Assembly responded to the requirement of the constitutional moment that existed
in our country and, in my opinion, still exists. They were provoked by the crisis-a
terminal crisis of the political system of the centralized government of parties-and of
practices that we had established in Venezuela in the 1940s. It was a system based on two
aspects: first, centralized states, and second, democracy of parties in which the parties
exercised the monopoly of participation and representation.
Particularly during the last two decades, the system needed to be changed to allow not
only the improvement of democracy but also the survival of democracy. This implied, on
the one hand, the transformation of the state to make it more democratic. This involved
demolishing the centralist government and constructing a decentralized system of
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government. In other words, it meant changing our centralized federation to a decentralized
federation.
On the other hand, it implied the creation of a new legal order to permit the effective
functioning of a social and participatory democracy that would incorporate individuals and
private institutions in to the social, economic, and political process and ensure political
participation in the exercise of the government. This is what was stated in the referendum
of April 1999 that created the Assembly.
But now the main question we must analyze regarding the new constitution of
December 1999 is whether it is able to respond to the demand of political reformation
established in the referendum of April 1999. We must also determine if the constitution
really contributes not only to overcoming the crisis of the system of centralized government
of parties, but also to constructing in its place a system of decentralized and participatory
state that would allow the preservation of democracy. In my opinion, the new constitution
neither ensures nor establishes a basis for safe transformation of the political system. On
the contrary, it constantly retains both the prevailing state centralism and the partisanship,
ensuring the monopoly of representation by the political parties and their agents, Of course,
new political parties are now involved, but it is still the same scheme.
In my opinion, we lost a unique historical opportunity to introduce the political
changes we need in democracy. Bear in mind that to convene a national constitutional
assembly in democracy is not a common political fact in our history. It is rather a very, very
exceptional one. In general terms, all the previous constitutional assemblies in our history
have always been established as a consequence of a revolution, a war, or a coup d'etat.
They have never been elected peacefully in democracy.
Then for the first time, last year, we democratically elected a constitutional assembly
to introduce, of course, that which was needed-the radical change that this system of state
centralists and democracy of parties needed. The change should have been designed by the
country in the Assembly elected in this case, as never before, without a constitutional break.
That is why only history will say if this new constitution is indeed the first one of a new
period of our political history, as it is often said by the President of the Republic, Mr. Hugo
Chdivez Frias, or if it is really one more of the last period that began in the 1940s in our
country.
Which political change can we expect now with this new constitution? The truth is
that the new constitution did not solve the central problem at the core of the political crisis,
to improve democracy, and does not establish the basis of democratic political change. In
fact, in my opinion, it aggravates the political crisis of our political system because it
established the constitutional basis for the development of a political authoritarianism based
on regulations that reinforced centralism, presidentialism, state paternalism, partisanship,
and militarism with the danger of the collapse of the democracy itself.
I refer in particular to these problems of our political constitution, adopted in a
democratic process, through this national assembly. In my opinion, it was conceived for
authoritarianism. In effect, from the political point of view, this 1999 constitution contains
a few very negative aspects, particularly in relation to the improvement of democracy that,
in my opinion, count more than the positive reform that it contains. Refer, for instance, to
the consolidation of the principles of the rules of law and justice with excellent mechanisms
of judicial review and of judicial reform and a very exhaustive enumeration of civil and
political rights. Unfortunately, this mechanism runs the risk of being put out of action,
given the element of authoritarianism and the concentration of power derived from all the
following aspects of the constitution.
The first aspect is the apparently innocent new name of the republic. We have
changed the name of the republic from the Republic of Venezuela to the Bolivarian
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Republic of Venezuela. In my opinion, this has a very clear partisan motivation. The
former name, Republic of Venezuela, was originally adopted in 1811 when, after the
independence from Spain, the Confederation of States of Venezuela, a confederation
criticized by Bolivar the following year, was established. The sole exception regarding this
name of the republic was the constitutional period between 1819 and 1830, which
corresponded to the Republic of Colombia established with the territory made up of both the
former Republic of Venezuela and the former Vice Royalty of Nueva Nicaragua, now
Colombia and Ecuador.

With the Constitution of 1821, part of the dream of Sim6n Bolivar regarding the union
of the people of Colombia and of America came true, but only during those nine years
between 1821 and 1830. The idea of the Bolivarian Republic historically points to a
political organization that implies the disappearance of Venezuela as a state. That is why
the change of the name of the republic is, in my opinion, totally unacceptable and contrary
not only to the idea of independence of our country, but also contrary to the thoughts of
Sim6n Bolivar. Consequently, the change of the name must have another explanation far
removed from the ideas of Bolivar. The actual partisan motivation derived from the initial
denomination of the political party established by the President of the Republic, Hugo
Chdvez, which was initially named "Bolivarian Movement 2000" in 1992 when he
attempted a coup d'etat.
The party of the President of the Republic is the Bolivarian party. The president has
imposed his party's name on the name of Republic. This happened, for instance, in
Nicaragua. Remember the Sandinista Party and the name of the state institution as
Sandinist. It also happened with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The second aspect I want to refer to is the process of decentralization, which has been
stopped with this constitution: The constitution formally regulates a decentralized federalist
state but within a centralist frame, and additionally, it eliminates the Senate from the scheme
of the federal state. In my opinion, one of the great political changes needed to be made by
the new constitution and by the assembly was the definitive transformation of the
centralized federation. We have never had during the last one hundred years an effective
decentralized federation with an effective territorial distribution of power toward the states
and the municipalities. The final result of the approved constitutional scheme of territorial
distribution of power has not meant any substantial advance regarding the process of
decentralization, particularly the one initiated in 1989.
Moreover, in many aspects the new constitution has meant an institutional step
backwards, and additionally, the constitutional regime in this matter is contradictory. The
autonomy of the states and municipalities must be protected by the constitution, but in the
new constitution, autonomy cannot only be limited by the constitution but by national laws.
This is contrary to what should be a constitutional guarantee of state autonomy. It is also
contradictory because the equality of the states is damaged as the Senate is eliminated in our
country, creating in the state a unicameral national assembly. Therefore our country, I
imagine, is now in the Guiness Book of Records for being a federation without a federal
Senate chamber.
The constitution is also contradictory regarding the equality of states, the process of
law framing, and the parliamentary control over the executive. Regarding the distribution of
powers between territorial entities, the decentralization process requires, above all, the
effective location of taxing powers to the states, specifically regarding sales taxes, as
happens in almost all federations. The advances of the prior constitution in this subject
were deficient. Now, all the taxation powers assigned to the states were removed, which is
a step backwards from the previous constitution.
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So the great reform of the political system, which was necessary and essential to
improve democracy, was to demolish the centralism of the state and to distribute the power
in the territories. It was the only way to make political participation come true. Only this,
in my opinion, justified the constitutional process. This, however, was postponed and with
it the great opportunity of substituting the centralist state into a decentralized state was lost.
The Constituent Assembly, in order to overcome the political crisis, should have designed
the transformation of the state by decentralizing power and establishing basis to effectively
present it to the citizens. The Assembly neither transformed the state nor arranged the
necessary things to make participation effective.
The third aspect I want to refer to is the relation between the electoral system of
proportional representation and the survival of the democracy of parties. In my opinion, the
new constitution did not tackle the other aspect of the political system that does require a
radical transformation: the political representation and participation necessary to avoid the
monopoly that political parties have had. As part of the political system we have had during
the last decade, political parties have been the sole mechanism of political participation and
the only ones who have obtained representation in the state order. This is maintained
according to the only electoral system established in the new constitution and, unfortunately,
all the proposals to establish even a nominal election for the representatives of the local
government, in order to obtain territorial or local representation of the respective
communities, were not accepted.
Another aspect that must be pointed out in the new constitution is the exaggerated
presidentialism that contrasts with the moderate presidentialism we had in our previous
constitution. This exaggerated presidentialism derives from the following four factors,
First, the extension of the presidential period from five to six years. Second, the immediate
reelection of the president of the republic, which we did not have previously. These two
elements strengthen the principle of alternation of government by permitting an excessively
long period of government, twelve years. But these first two elements are combined with
two others. The third factor is the referendum established to revoke the mandate regulated
in a way that makes it almost inapplicable. Fourth, the failure to establish the principle of
presidential election by an absolute majority and the double ballot system establishing
instead election by relative majority which affect governance.
With this presidential model, the possibility of dissolution of the Assembly by the
president of the republic has been added in the exceptional case of three parliamentary votes
of no-confidence in the executive. This presidential system exaggerates presidential weight,
and does not have the counterweight that exists in the bicameral system due to the
unicameral system that has been established. Moreover, the presidential model is reinforced
in other ways, such as by the admission of a wide legislative delegation by the Assembly to
the president of the republic in order to enact laws not limited to economic and financial
matters but in any subject whatsoever. This has no precedent in any constitution in the
world and could affect, for instance, regulations on human rights by executive legislation.
The fifth aspect I must refer to in the new constitution is the imbalance in the
separation of powers because of a certain concentration of powers in the unicameral
National Assembly. With the shaping of our presidential system of government, the
constitution adopted a scheme of separation of power not only between the legislative and
the executive, but also between the judicial power, whose autonomy is repeatedly
established, and also between the two new powers established in the constitution. These
new powers are the citizens' power, which involves the general prosecutor, the public
defender, and the general comptroller of the republic and the electoral power exercised by
the National Electoral Council. We now have five powers instead of three. But an effective
separation of powers is based on its balance and on the independence among them. The
origin of tenure by election or appointment of the heads of state powers should not be at the
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mercy of any of the other powers of the state. In this new constitution, on the contrary, an
imbalance among the state powers is established. The National Assembly is authorized to
remove the general prosecutor, the public defender, the general comptroller, the members of
the National Electoral Council, and worse, the Magistrate of the Supreme Court of Justice.
This constitutes the antithesis of the independence and the counterweight between the
powers of the state and makes up a model of concentration of power in the National
Assembly as a political organ, which is totally incompatible with a democratic political
society.
Finally, within the innovation of the new constitution, I must refer to the constitutional
base for the military in the newly established constitution. Yes, in this new constitution, a
marked military scheme is added to the presidentialism-as-a-government form and to the
concentration of powers in the National Assembly. This combination can easily lead to an
authoritarian form of government. In the constitution, the whole idea of subjection, of all
subordination, of the military authority to the civil authority was eliminated. On the
contrary, significant autonomy of military authority and of the armed forces was established
with the possibility of intervening without any limiting civil conscience.
This is shown in the following regulations. First, the traditional prohibition of
simultaneously exercising military and civil authority was eliminated. Second, the civil
parliamentarian control exercised regarding the promotion of high-ranking military, which
now is an exclusive attribution of the armed force, was eliminated. Third, the apolitical
character of the military institution and its character as "non-deliberator" was also
eliminated, which opens a path for the armed forces to delegate and intervene in the affairs
being resolved by the state organs. Fourth, the obligation of the armed forces of looking
after the stability of the democratic institution foreseen expressly in the previous
constitution was eliminated.
Fifth, and even more serious, the elimination of the obligation of the armed forces to
obey the constitution and laws whose observance is always over any other obligation-as it
was stated in the previous constitution-was eliminated. Sixth, the military was expressly
granted the right to vote for the first time, which could be politically incompatible with the
principle of obedience. Seventh, the constitution established the necessity of decision by
the Supreme Court, judging on the merits when prosecuting high-ranked military in the

armed forces, which had alvays been a procedural privilege kept for high civilian officials

like the president of the republic. Eighth, the use of any kind of arms in our country is now
subject to the authority of the armed forces, a control that used to be attributed to the civil
administration. Ninth, the armed forces can be granted all attributes of the police.
Finally, tenth, the concept of the national security doctrine, defined in a global total
and omni-comprehensive way, was adopted. According to this doctrine, developed in the
military regimes of Latin America in the 1970s, almost everything that happens in the nation
concerns state security, even the economic and social development. All this gives rise to a
military scheme that is constitutionally a novelty and that can lead to a situation in which the
armed forces could constitutionally seize the civil administration of the state. The new
constitution additionally granted the armed forces an active participation in national
development. All of these provisions show a constitutional picture of militarism truly
unique in our political and constitutional history, one that is not found even in the
constitution of our own former military regimes.
From all this, I conclude by saying that the political constitution of Venezuela, when
analyzed globally, highlights an institutional scheme conceived for authoritarianism that is
derived from combining state centralism, the exaggerated presidentialism, the democracy of
parties, the concentration of power in the assembly, and the militarism that constitutes the
central element designed for the organization of the power of the state. In my opinion, that
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is not what was required for the improvement of democracy. On the contrary, it should have
been based on the decentralization of power, a controlled and moderate presidentialism,
political participation to balance the power of the state, and subjugation of the military
authority to the civil authority.
That is why, in my opinion, the Constitution of 1999 did not introduce the change the
country needed. Instead, the constitutional movement, which originated in the crisis of the
political model of the centralist state of parties established from 1945 and restored in 1958,
is a terminal crisis that, in my opinion, continues. The country needed a radical change to
improve democracy, to make it more representative, and to structure a democratic,
decentralized, and participating state. None of this was accomplished, and the result is a
constitutional authoritarianism scheme that can harm democracy itself in the future.
D.

Statement ofProfessorH. W.Perry,Jr.

Much of what I wanted to say today has already been said. I will try to be brief so that
we can take time for questions. We have an extraordinary collection of people both on our
panels and in our audience who are experts on the countries represented here today. I am
not. I am a professor of political science and law who studies democratic institutions.
Though some political scientists do have country specialties, we are all in the business of
trying to explain and predict phenomena, generate hypotheses, put things in a broader
context, and generalize. I take seriously what Professor Shumway and Dean Sharlot saidthat there is a great danger in people giving advice who do not deeply understand cultures,
histories, and experiences. I am not here to give advice or even make many normative
claims. I want to put on my political science hat today and be an analyst who makes some
non-country-specific observations. That said, most of us do not like to give away our
normative hats, nor can we ignore events in particular countries. As an example, some
scholars say that some of the problems that have come about in Venezuela have been a
result of insufficient condemnation by other Latin American countries of what went on in
Peru a few years before. Such an "analytical" observation, of course, has normative
underpinnings.
My role today is to convey some of what we know about democratization and
democratic institutions in general and presidential-legislative relations more specifically,
and then try to raise some questions for discussion. Much of what I shall say today comes
from other scholars. Notably I draw from the works of Samuel Huntington, Larry Diamond,
Juan Linz, Scott Mainwairing, Timothy Scully, Matthew Shugart, John Carey, and others. I
am trying to summarize what many scholars on democracy have said, without taking time to
cite them individually.
If we do this conference again five years from now, I suspect the question will not be
whether any of these countries is still a "democracy." It will be what kind of democracy
they are. That question is relevant today. Democracy seems to be here to stay. You are
probably familiar with Sam Huntington's book, The Third Wave: Democratization in the
Late Twentieth Century. He talks about the inordinate growth of democracies since the
overthrow of the dictator in Portugal in 1974. Since then, the world has seen vast growth in
democratization. In 1974, there were roughly 145 countries, of which 27% were
democracies. In 1996, we peaked with 191 countries, of which 62% were democracies.
The news is not all good, however. From 1974 to 1991 there have been at least twenty-two

countries that have suffered breakdowns in their democratic situation and there have been
several recessions, but by and large, there has been a huge movement toward democracy
with little in the way that we would talk about as a reverse wave of erosion. The big concern
these days is not so much transition to democracy, but consolidation of this third wave of
democracy. Transition to democracy has been the wave, and it is quite likely that with the
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pressure of international organizations, the world monetary fund, and so forth we will
continue to see democracies form.
As important as transition and consolidation are, it seems to me we are now ready to
move to the next step in terms of what we talk about. What do we mean when we talk about
democracy? Many people simply refer to the concept of electoral democracy. Joseph
Schumpeter defined it as a system "for arriving at political decisions in which individuals
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."
Adam Przeworski defined it as "a regime in which governmental offices are filled as a
consequence of contested elections." Many scholars and others talk about and define
democracy basically as a definition of an electoral system. But there are many who have
come to believe that while that is certainly a very important basis for a democratic system,
we need to talk about more. The idea is sometimes referred to as the notion of what we
would consider a "liberal democracy," which is more than just an electoral system.
One of America's most famous political scientists, Robert Dahl, talked about a
"polyarchy" which was distinguished from an ideal but unobtainable true democracy. It was
characterized by: (1) opposition-organized contestation through regular, free and fair
elections; (2) participation-the right of virtually all adults to vote and contest for office;
and (3) nonelectoral dimensions such as the freedom to speak and publish dissenting views,
the freedom to form and join organizations, and the freedom to access alternative sources of
information.
One of the "hottest" scholars and commentators on liberal democracy these days is
Larry Diamond at Stanford who talks about eleven components of democracy. Today, I
want to mention a couple of notable additions he makes to conditions for democracy. First,
we should consider the control of the state. Do its key decisions and allocations lie, in fact

as well as in constitutional theory, with elected officials and not democratically
unaccountable actors or foreign powers-in particular is the military subordinate to the
authority of the elected civilian officials? In other words, you can have all the elections you
want, but if real power lies in other institutions that are not accountable to the elected vote
in meaningful ways, then there are democratic problems.
Second, is there some way to protect individual rights and group rights when they
make their claims? Generally this is talked about in terms of non-discriminatory judiciaries
whose decisions are enforced and respected by other centers of power. In other words, is
there the "rule of law?" Among other things, the rule of law protects citizens from
unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture, and undue interference in their personal lives not
only by the state but also by organized nonstate or antistate forces.
Third, we have often talked about vertical accountability, that is, holding our rulers
accountable to those whom they rule. Evolution of democratic systems also must talk about
horizontal accountability, especially the constraint of executive power constitutionally, and
in fact by the autonomous power of other governmental institutions such as a parliament or
legislature orjudiciary.
All of our speakers today, I think, have given eloquent testimony to what their
countries have struggled with and what concerns them about these issues varies. We are
really talking about a huge range of situations that range from liberal democracies at one
end to formal electoral democracies with no real competition, dissent, or protection of
freedoms.
Much of the focus of the conference today is on horizontal accountability. From a
perspective of liberal democracy, horizontal accountability is a good thing, but it brings
with it problems. Democracy has to deliver the goods, just as any form of government has
to deliver the goods. It has to deliver some form of economic well-being. It has to deliver
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some form of a sense of justice. Yet, separation-of-power systems are generally created to
have checks and balances on powers which often makes governments less efficient, less able
to deliver the goods. Let us now look more closely at some specific issues regarding
horizontal accountability.
As our speakers have all pointed out today, one of the primary features of Latin
American democracies is presidentialism. Political scientists have debated at length about
the desirability of presidentialism versus parliamentarianism. Several argue that presidential
systems are far less likely to succeed or sustain democracy than are parliaments. Political
scientists are infatuated with strong and disciplined parties and Westminster systems of
government. Even within the United States, there have been calls to try to make our form of
government more parliamentarian. That is not going to happen here, and it seems to me that
as Professor Rosenkrantz and others have pointed out, that is probably not going to happen
in Latin America either. Nevertheless, we need to talk about some of the criticisms of
presidential systems even if solutions to the problems can be only incremental.
Critics of Latin American presidential systems suggest that one of the problems is the
fixed term for the presidency. This often strikes some people as ironic given that the
problem most countries face is the need to control the executive. Severely limited terms,
however, may do more harm than good. Presidents have a sense of real urgency to get
something done. If the legislative body gets in the way of the president's agenda and he has
a limited time frame to accomplish his goals, that often leads to less than democratic
procedures to achieve certain goals. Moreover, there is an incentive to try to control the
succeeding presidents.
One thing we might want to talk about today is the wisdom of fixed terms for
presidents and the length of terms for presidents. Perhaps there should be either longer
terms or increased opportunity to be reelected. But again, in the context of many Latin
American democracies, where the problem is often executive dominance of executive
power, people seem to be loath to think about that.
If there is true horizontal accountability of a president to a legislature, it can lead to
immobilism. Immobilism is often the major cause of coups or executive power grabs.
Ironically, then, those things that constrain presidents, like limitations to one term, or strong
legislatures can also serve to encourage presidents to engage in bad behavior. How then do
we, at once, limit executives, but not make them ineffective? Often reformers and others
focus solely on constitutional structures, but one thing that political scientists talk about
absolutely all the time, that unfortunately lawyers rarely discuss, is the importance of
political parties and how they function in the structural system. Are the aggregations of
interests done through multiple party systems, or largely between two parties? You can talk
until the cows come home-to use an English expression-about executive-legislative
powers and relations, but if you do not have a fundamental understanding of how parties
form, how they aggregate their interests, and how structural provisions shape and interact
with party structures, then many of the reforms or issues that we are talking about will be
superficial.
I have run out of time, but one topic that we may want to discuss later is the
extraordinary institution of executive decrees. Most students of Latin American politics
realize the important role that these play, but executive decrees come in all shapes and sizes
and they vary a great deal in terms of what they mean and the extent to which they may or
may not be desirable.
In conclusion, when we talk about "democracy" we need to be more precise about
what we mean. Electoral democracy is not liberal democracy, and as we discuss reforms,
we must be attuned to what democratic goals we seek. Likewise, every country represented
here has unique history, structures, situations, and political actors; but there are some
generalizations that can be made that enable us to predict outcomes despite seemingly
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unique circumstances. Political science and the experiences of others that we learn at a
conference such as this can aid in our abilites. The trick is knowing what can be profitably
learned and applied to a specific circumstance. Political science can provide many
generalizable lessons about power, incentives, structures, etc., but what it often cannot do is
translate that knowledge with nuance and understanding to particular situations. Political
actors and reformers, however, must learn that not all situations are as unique as they think
and they can profit from stepping back and seeing their situation in a broader context.
IV.

PANEL Two: PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES

DURING TIMES OF TRANSITION
4.

PanelIntroductionby ProfessorSarah Cleveland

It is my pleasure to preside over a very distinguished panel that will be examining the
role of protections for civil and human rights in emergent and fragile democracies in Latin
America. We discussed this morning the questions and tensions presented by various
constitutional structures seen in Latin American democracies. This afternoon's first panel

will focus particularly on individual rights issues that have pervaded all of Latin America in
the last several decades. Across Latin America, countries that emerge into democratic
governments with a prior history of either severe civil war, such as Guatemala, and!or prior
military totalitarian regimes, have a great deal of trouble internalizing civil rights
protections into their governmental systems, in part because the people who used to have
guns often still have guns. The people who used to be in the military sometimes simply
become the civilian police force. There may not be adequate training for people. Structures
for the administration ofjustice and the court systems may be weak relative to the executive,
as we saw this morning. All of these issues pose challenges for the protection of human

rights.
B.

Statement of ProfessorMartin Bihmer

Language here is going to be important, because we have to translate a few words
from English into Spanish, and as Professor Shumway knows, the translation is not always

that easy. For example, we do not have a word for "enforcement," which could be related to
our tendency toward anomie. "Civil rights" is also a very difficult concept to translate into
Spanish because of our different cultural backgrounds. "Civil rights" or "civil law," in the
legal culture of Latin America, has very many different meanings. I will be referring here to
the kinds of things that Americans refer to when they refer to civil rights. I am basically
thinking of something connected to what happened in the United States in the 1950s and
1960s with the efforts to end segregation and the work of different agencies, lawyers, law
schools, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and judges. That kind of activity and
that kind of way of doing politics are a little bit alien to our Latin American culture. So let
me try to tell you what is going on in Argentina while we are trying to do something that can
be related to the civil rights movement here in the United States, namely, to start a public
interest law practice.
The way I would have put the panels together here at UT would have been different if
I wanted to tell you chronologically the story of Argentina. I would have started with
human rights because that is the way we started. And I think it made sense. IWhen a
country like Argentina left behind a dictatorship that also produced massive human rights
violations, it makes a lot of sense to start with human rights. Argentina started with a very
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important task: to bring justice to the past, including trying the military in 1995, just a year
and a half after democracy started again in Argentina. So we started with human rights.
The agenda of human rights, of course, is not over. We still have trials. But the
importance of other things started to become apparent; and those things were the kinds of
things that Carlos Rosenkrantz talked about this mroming. And thus we started to discuss
institutional engineering and finally we reformed our constitution in 1994.
Our public interest law program in the University of Palermo Law School Clinic and
the Association of Civil Rights that we created were established in 1994, right after the new
constitution was passed. I think there were some nice step-by-step movements there-from
human rights to institutional building to civil rights. When the urgency of human rights
begins to fade away, you start thinking that maybe the institutional arrangements had
something to do with what happened in the past in Argentina. Then you want to rebuild
them and you want to make them function. I am going to talk about how you make
institutions function in order to provide rights to the people. I think that is the idea of the
civil rights movement or what I will call here the public interest law initiatives
Our civil society was not very strong. In fact, most of our civil society's organizations
were crushed by the dictatorship. But once we got democracy back, the organizations of the
civil society worked, thinking that the system should be changed mainly through two
different sets of procedures. The most obvious one was lobbying and lobbying in different
settings, such as the administrative agencies and the Congress. And when they do that, they
do it, as some of you know, very modestly and case-by-case. It is important to notice here
that there is no regulation of lobbying in Argentina at all. The second method would be a
set of different ways of getting the citizens involved in the processes of law-making, such as
public hearings, recalls, or plebiscites.
I would say that the NGOs at some point noticed that this was not enough, that they
were not getting any results. They started to think that maybe the use of the law was one
instrument that they could use to change things. This was a major departure from our past
because law and the judicial process were never recognized as ways of changing things.
They had good reasons for that. Judges, the legal system, and the legal profession were
never aids to the civil society. They never provided what the civil society should expect
from them for many different reasons that I will mention later.
It is interesting to mention this because our system is not the traditional continental
law system. The traditional continental law system will support the idea that the civil
society should go to the Congress to change things, because that is the place to do politics.
The executive and the judiciary are not there to do politics because they do not have the
legitimacy to do it. The judiciary in the continental law tradition is an independent,
scientific, neutral agency that only applies the law that the people draft and pass in congress.
So the judge and the lawyer are just neutrally applying the law. They are doing their job as
bureaucrats.
But interestingly enough, our political system and our system of judicial review copied
the American system that gives to the citizens, and only to the citizens, the incredible power
to defy laws that they, the people, think are not constitutional. But the myth of the
traditional continental system was so strong in Argentina that nobody was using, or I should
say not many of the civil society organizations were using, the law to change things.
But once you decide to start using the judicial process to change things you have to be
aware that our system has something to do with the American system. We do have judicial
review, but our judicial review lacks one thing that is very important. We do not believe in
stare decisis because we have the continental law tradition. That means precedents are not
binding for the judge. This is, in our legal folklore, the way we think about ourselves. So
when you win a case in the Supreme Court, you win just that case. Supposedly, you cannot
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use the case for a political agenda. You have to win over and over again for every case that
arises in a certain context. It would be as if Brown v.Board ofEducation had to be litigated

every year, for every case, for every child in the United States. That is a very important
limitation. Another limitation is, since we do not have stare decisis, judges decide one way
one day with one interpretation of the statute and maybe another judge or even the same
judge of the same court later will decide otherwise, with a different interpretation of the
same statute. That makes the legal process a very difficult arena in which to win political
cases. Another limit was standing, since the only way to have your day in court was to be
the affected party.
As you can imagine, with all these limitations and many others, it is very difficult to
develop a public interest law activity. But some things started to change with the
amendments introduced in the 1994 constitutional reform.
The first reform had to do with legal standing. Now in Argentina there is something
that we call amparo colectivo which means that NGOs by themselves have standing in front
of the courts in order to litigate cases of discrimination, consumer rights, economic
competition, and the environment. They do not need a single party-an individual--to
litigate a case. Now, with the new Constitution, we can use the law in order to do things
that we could not do before.
The second reform was introduced in 1984 by a new democratic government and a
new Supreme Court. This new court decided a few cases in which they started to suggest
that they wiU be bound by their precedents, or at least they said that they were open to begin
discussing that some lines of decisions would be held for at least some time. There Avas
some discussion after the packing of the court in 1990 by President Menem about whether
this position would be followed but at least the discussion is there. The question whether
the court has the right to change its mind any time it wants or if it needs to respect what
Professor Dworkin calls the principle of integrity-the idea that what you said in the past
should influence in some consistent way your current decisions-is still undetermined.
With those two reforms in mind, we started working with cases. In the beginning we
approached a group of NGOs to tell them that we were prepared to work for free for them
and that we wanted to litigate public interest law cases. Their reply was, "What is a case?

What do you mean? We do not have cases." So another feature that we needed to take care
of to begin doing public interest law in Argentina was some kind of legal education for the

NGOs about what a case was, how you define a case, and how you find a case. WVe were
lucky enough to get a few cases through the work of Poder Ciudadano (or citizen power), an
NGO. They started to identify cases and started to call us to see if the case they had in hand
was a case that we could litigate for them. We had to construct our clients, as you see,
because they were not there.
We had to have clients, as well as a new definition of a judge, and a new definition of
standing. We still have a lot of things to do because public interest lawsuits are more than
litigation and impact litigation. For example, we have to regulate public interest lobbying
and regulate rule-making in order to be effective in a lot of instances.
We had some good cases and we won a few that were interesting. We do not have
stare decisis in our legal tradition so if we won a case, the question remained as to what
happens with the rest of the people that were in the same position as our client. That's why
we started to work with the press. The press would put the case in the public arena and
people that were in the same position would know that we won a case, the idea being that if
they had a lawyer that is willing to follow our path, they will get the same result as we did.
Also, judges look at the case differently when the case is important and is in the press.
Another reason for involving the press is for other judges to know that another judge
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decided the case that way. Our judges do not look at cases of other judges in their
jurisdiction that often.
We needed many more lawyers in order to make our work more efficient. One very

important part of the whole process was to discover that our legal education was not
providing the kind of lawyers and judges that would be willing to work in this way with the
law. That is why we started a clinic in the law school. We started working with the clinic at
the University of Palermo, and we started teaching law differently. My students in the clinic
go back to their courses discussing things that came up in our cases, things that their own
professors would not think about because they are brand new. For example, what happens
when an NGO wins a public interest law case in a Latin American legal system
environment? What happens when they lose? What happens with other people that were
not in the case, but to whom the decision applies? What happens with the rest of the
people? What happens to the rest of the class if somebody loses a public interest law case
in an amparo colectivo? Who defines the class? Since class action does not exist in
Argentina, these questions are of utmost importance and they were never addressed by
constitutional law teachers.
So in the end, the civil rights activity that we are doing now has two separate agendas.
We are instrumental to the agendas of our clients. That means we are their free lawyers.
We are trying to start a dialogue with them of how our cases can help their agendas. But it
is interesting that we also have our own agenda-what we call the agenda of the public
interest law in Argentina. It is a different agenda that uses the cases of our clients to further
define the legal tools in order to do our work. I usually say that we are building the boat as
we sail. Because all the things that we are using, all these tools, are brand new; nobody
knows what they entail. They do not know what the consequences are or how you define
their effects. But we need these tools in order to help our clients. And in order to define
them, we need our clients and their cases. So with our cases we are defining the amparo
colectivo, we are pushing for legal standing for NGOs, and we are avoiding the idea that
you cannot do these things until Congress passes a law.
As you can see, working with civil rights in a Latin American country that is in the
middle of a transition to another system requires pulling many strings together. We have to
rethink our legal system, the position of the judge, and the whole folklore of the tradition of
the continental civil law. We have to rethink the role of the lawyer in our society (there is
no pro bono work in Argentina at all, so we have to rethink that as well). We have to
change our legal education. We have to work with the press and reach out to the civil
society. It is a very interesting and challenging work, but we need lots of things-things
that an American lawyer takes for granted when talking about civil rights.
C.

Statement of Ms. Helen BeatrizMack Chang

My sister, an anthropologist, was murdered in 1990. That was in the first civilian
government after many years of authoritarian and military governments. In the 1960s,
1970s, 1980s, and the beginning of the 1990s, our political history in Guatemala was that
everybody who was involved in human rights or social justice or had democratic ideas was
seen as an internal enemy. We were targeted for disappearance, murder, torture, or forced
exile. I have some conclusions from the Truth Commission Report in which it was made
very clear that all the historical roots of armed conflicts-and the role played by every state
institution in the internal conflict-means that today we do not have a state.
The weakness of democratic institutions is so great that the end result is that there is
no state in Guatemala, which easily leads to an inability to govern. During the period of
this conflict, the people who work for the human rights organizations have to be involved in
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some URNG organizations in order to survive, which means to be involved in some guerilla
movement
When my sister was murdered, I wanted to prove that she was not involved in any

leftist military organization. She was working with the church; but even the church was
stigmatized as being Communist. I went alone to the judicial system. Everybody thought I
was crazy. They asked, "How do you go to the judicial system if the judicial system does
not work?" The judicial system is supporting the internal conflict. Everything-the police,
the ministerioptiblico-was in agreement with the military. My response to the question of
why I was going there was that "it is the only weapon I have to search for justice."
Six months later, the chief of police, who was in charge of the investigation, was
murdered after he gave testimony about my sister's case. All the witnesses went into exile;
we were threatened. Everybody looked at me like I was a crazy person for trying to fight
against the system. I was alone. I did not have a lawyer because the lawyers were afraid to
take my sister's case; I had to study the law and fight the system alone.
In 1993 we obtained a conviction of the military officer, and I received the Right
Livelihood Award. People no longer thought I was crazy. They were proud that Guatemala
had a Nobel Prize laureate and an alternative Nobel Prize winner. There was no more fear.
This gives you an idea of how human rights and human rights organizations were so
stigmatized, and how sometimes these awards help to give you protection. That is why it is
so hard to fight for civil rights. As Carlos Rosenkrantz said, sometimes before talking about
civil rights, you have to talk about human rights-fundamental rights. We say we have so
many international instruments for human rights, but in the past, the present, and in the
future, human rights violations always exist. Sometimes you get very frustrated as a victim
because you do not see results of these international instruments. You go by paradigmatic
cases and many people-maybe the majority of the people-do not see any results of these.
So that is why, at least in Guatemala, people sometimes do not believe in international
legislation. We now have violent contras in which there are contradictions between human
rights and security, where human rights activists are seen as the protectors of criminals.
Why do we defend the criminals and vhy do we not seek the death penalty? In 1998 and
1999, Guatemala had the highest rate of lynchings in Central America because our system
does not work. People who received convictions got out ofjail, resulting in increased desire
to implement capital punishment, which is now supported by eighty percent of the
population. But the use of the death penalty means the denouncement of the San Jose Pact.
Peru has not accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, and Guatemala likewise
wants to denounce that pact.
The result is that now, for example, the defendant of the military, Gabriel Orellana, is
now the Chancellor. The military officer I am accusing of murdering my sister is the
advisor to the Chancellor. You see, the moment you start questioning the possibilities, you
have to have justice in my sister's case. The truth commission has named my sister's case
as a paradigmatic case. When you see that Bishop Gerardi, who was a coordinator of the
memory project, was murdered forty-eight hours after he presented the case, and there is no
sign of justice, you see that maybe we can have the truth, the political truth of who was
murdered, but we will not have justice.
I do not know if you have heard about the military diary. It was a diary which in 1999
had 300 files of people in Guatemala who had disappeared. The diary contained a picture
of each person and what they were carrying, the identification document, the name of which
movement they belonged to, and what their destination was. They may also have had a
code, like 300, which means that person was murdered. Of those 300 cases, no case has
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gone forward. But at the same time there is a speech of democratization and modernization
ofjustice. So what do we do?
The goal of the Foundation is to try to contribute and collaborate by making proposals
for the modernization and changes of justice. That means organizing other groups who
were affected by common crimes. After my sister's case, many other cases started coming
forward, such as Michael Devine, Diana Ortiz, and also some human rights cases. The
government and URNG signed the truth commission agreement, and all of those human
rights cases are falling out of the public eye. Now it seems that the internal conflict stopped
using guns, but started in the justice system.
Currently, we are establishing organizations with people who are involved with or
affected by these common crimes. Organizations such as Madres Angustiadas (Anguished
Mothers), FADS, and many others appeared. We got all of these organizations together and
started pressuring and lobbying the justice system with one voice so that the system would
have to hear us. Many of our complaints were heard, and we made some recommendations
about changes we want. But we also have to fight with the parallel structure that is being
created in this state, because there is a state within a state. That is why I am here. I was
talking to Congresswoman Lourdes Flores Nano. Peru is leaving the inverse of what
Guatemala is leaving. We are trying to be more democratized, and the Peruvians are
reverting to authoritarians, and they are also creating a parallel system like Guatemala is.
Another one of the problems in Guatemala is a weak civil society; these historical
human rights leaders pass through and are now politicians, creating a vacuum in human
rights. That is why we had to support these other organizations of civilians, even if they do
not care about human rights. In fact, many of them want the death penalty. But you can
pursue at least some influence in the legislature by pressuring-trying to make justice not
only for lawyers; trying to understand that justice is something that belongs to everybody.
Justice is not only norms and codes. There is another sense of justice-moral justice. We
urged the legislative and the judicial systems, and all the judges, policemen, and
congressmen, that they had to understand that they have a duty and a conscience to go
forward and that they cannot have the dogs pitch by saying they will do one thing and then
doing the reverse of what they said. That is what we are doing now. I think that civil
society still has to be straightened out even more, as participation also means risk of life due
to the polarization and stigmatization that are still in Guatemala. We still hope to use
international instruments of human rights, though many may disagree. But every time, it is
with much fear that we are trying to organize again.
Our challenge is to move beyond denouncing and be professional in our proposals to
the legislature and to the judicial power. Our goal is that every time we make a
denouncement, we must also have a technical proposal either to the legislative, judicial, or
executive branch. Sometimes we have problems because we need more professionals or
technicians to help us prepare our proposals. I think that there is hope; many societies have
passed through these crises. Argentina, Chile, Peru, and even Colombia or El Salvador
have walked through the same crisis. The reconciliation process is also very important,
especially when you have to conceptualize. Everybody has a different concept of what
reconciliation is and what participation is. Mental health (sahdmental) is also important in
this reconciliation process to strengthen democracy or strengthen our civil or human rights.
We have a long way to walk, but Guatemala is not a very simple country. It is not only
complicated, but complex due to the fact that we have two countries, the indigenous
population is still very excluded, and it is a country that is sometimes not recognized by the
Latinos. So we have a long way. But, I think, we hope that we do not go backwards after
the election of this new government, which is also very complicated. We cannot see this
government as it is the political party that incamates the myth of genocide. Because you
have on the other hand people like the coordinator of the memory project and also one of
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the commissioners of the Truth Commission, it is very complicated to analyze in just a
simple way. I agree that you have to strengthen the political practice, but that is not
everything. I think that the economic and social conditions also have a very great weight in
democracy. Democracy is expensive, and when you have a majority of people who are
poor, sometimes you do not see democracy as viable. If you do not have a middle class,
then when the globalization is done, it widens the gap between the poor and the rich. You
can talk about democracy because that means more taxes, more organizations, and more
education. Guatemala has a sixty-four percent illiteracy rate. We have one of the highest
illiteracy rates, or one of the highest after Haiti. So I am not saying that I do not have any
hope in the democratic system. I am saying that it is very complicated. We are in the Third
World. Maybe other South American countries are in the Second World-like Argentina,
Chile, or Colombia even-because they have changed from depending on raw materials to
having an industrial economy. Guatemala does not have any industries. Mexico is beating
us because, although the United States runs the border from the Rio Grande to Tijuana,
Mexico shares the border with all of Central America. So I think that there are many things
that are very complex. Civil rights can be fought, but we need the courage and we need our
dignity to be rescued after many years of repression. We need more education. We need
many things, but we have hope and that is very important.
D.

Statement ofProfessor Sarah Cleveland

Professor Martin Shapiro was at the law school last weekend, and he has done a good
bit of work on the jurisprudence of constitutional courts in new democracies around the
world. He raised the question of whether or not courts in new and fragile democracies need
to focus primarily on separation of powers issues in their initial jurisprudence rather than
civil rights and human rights adjudication. This is based on the theory that, until the civil
society has internalized sufficient respect for the rule of law and until the court has sufficient
legitimacy to be able to make rulings that will be respected by the other branches of
government, perhaps civil rights and human rights decisions are the most threatening to the
ability of courts to establish themselves as independent and autonomous institutions. This is
because they cannot enforce their decisions against an executive that will not respect them.
I think both of the cases on this panel raise the alternate question of whether or not rights
issues, in societies where rights have been oppressed for so many years, are not perhaps one
of the best ways that a court system can establish its independence and help establish respect
for rule of law in the society. I simply throw that out for possible future discussions.
I am Sarah Cleveland, and I teach Foreign Affairs and International Human Rights
here at the Law School. I am not a Latin Americanist; my specific area of interest is U.S.
foreign relations law and the internalization and incorporation of international law doctrines
into domestic legal systems. I am going to speak today briefly about two examples of the
ways in which international human rights norms have been incorporated into domestic law
systems.
The speakers this morning from Peru and Venezuela both gave examples of the use of
law-specifically constitutional amendments-to destroy the rule of law in those respective
countries. Both countries had incorporated into their constitutional systems greater
centralization and greater authoritarianism, constitutional change that was not clearly
consistent with democratic rule. I think the case of Argentina is an example of precisely the
opposite move, in which Argentina tried to advance the cause of civil and human rights by
writing into its constitution broad international human rights norms.
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In 1994, Argentina adopted a new constitution. Their constitution had not been
amended since 1853. In article 75.22 of the new constitution, Argentina adopted in whole
cloth a number of international human rights treaties as the constitutional law of Argentina.
These included the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and its optional protocol; the Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights; the Torture and Genocide Conventions; the Conventions to Eliminate all
Forms of Racial Discrimination and All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The latter two are among treaties that have not been
ratified by the United States.
Argentina took the position that these treaties would have constitutional status. In
other words, they are not simply superior to statutes, but they are equal to other
constitutional rights in that they can only be renounced with the approval of the executive
and a two-thirds majority vote in both houses of the legislature. Also, they would not be
interpreted to alter existing rights in the constitution-they were supplementing, not
altering, rights.
Professor Rosenkrantz this morning commented that Argentina is "weird." Argentina
is at least unique in the extent to which it has reached out and incorporated international
human rights provisions whole cloth into the constitution. It is a dramatic example of
domestic internalization of international law norms, at least on paper. The question that
remains is whether it has really mattered to the protection and enforcement of civil and
human rights in Argentina.
My impression is that, in its initial foray into the area, the Argentinean Supreme Court
reviewed the constitutionality of Argentina's criminal procedures and held their criminal
appeal procedures to be unconstitutional. They looked to the American Convention on
Human Rights as constitutional authority for Argentina because the American Convention
protects appellate rights and criminal proceedings. The Court concluded that Argentina's
process was invalid. In that decision, it both confirmed the constitutional status of the treaty
and observed that international jurisprudence and the decisions of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights served as a guide for interpretation of the treaty for purposes of
Argentinean law.
This was a very strong activist announcement by the Court that it was embracing
international human rights rules as constitutional law. Since that decision, a number of
other decisions by the Supreme Court and lower courts have come down which have been
much more modest in their approach to the human rights treaty clause. In some situations,
they have simply looked to international law, as U.S. courts often do, to supplement a
decision that they were reaching on other grounds. In some circumstances, they have
construed international law to be consistent with whatever the existing Argentinean practice
was, and in some contexts, they have interpreted the clause that says the incorporation of the
treaties cannot alter existing constitutional rights to conclude that the international treaties
did not affect existing Argentinean practice.
So rather than seeing the internationalization of Argentinean law, we may be seeing
the domestication of international law by Argentina's legal decision-makers. There are a
number of things going on here, many of which have already been eloquently articulated on
this panel. Argentina's is not a culture that is used to looking to law for remedies or
enforcing rights through its judiciary system on the American model. Lawyers and the
population at large are not familiar with this concept and judges are not either. So a good
bit of education has been undertaken and will continue to be undertaken to try to further
explore what the treaty provision means for Argentina.
I think that it is probably an overly ambitious move by Argentina. When you simply
incorporate in toto a series of provisions that cover a vast range of social, political,
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economic, and cultural rights and pronounce them constitutional rights, you may undermine
the validity of, and respect for, fundamental rights. Vacation time may not have the same
status, for example, as protection against torture and so forth. The provisions also may not
have the legitimacy that they would have if the legislature itself had enacted them as
domestic law rather than simply stapling them to the constitution. It is a very interesting
example and the result remains to be seen. I hope to be proven wrong in the Argentinean
case. At any rate, last year Venezuela adopted a similar provision in its new constitution, so
we will now have two models to watch.
The other situation I wanted to talk about, since I did not think that any panel on civil

rights in Latin America would be complete without some discussion of this, is the role of the
United States, either as part of the problem or part of the solution, with respect to civil rights
violations in Latin America. I think that the present debate in Congress regarding foreign
assistance to Colombia in its anti-narcotic trafficking efforts is a poignant place to look.
The U.S. law regarding foreign assistance-and that means foreign aid for
development, security, and police purposes abroad, and for other purposes-has included
conditions that aid should be provided contingent on a country's respect for human rights, or
at least conditioned in the sense that it is not to be available to countries that are gross
violators of international human rights. These provisions were all put in U.S. foreign
assistance laws in the 1970s following Vietnam, Watergate, and the Church Commission
hearings regarding CIA activities in Latin America and elsewhere. The Commission
revealed, in part, U.S. involvement in the deposing of Allende in Chile and efforts by the
CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro by sending him things like exploding cigars, and other
revelations that were extraordinarily embarrassing to the U.S. national security system.
Following these revelations, U.S. foreign assistance law was amended to say that
human rights should be part of U.S. foreign policy and that aid should not be given to states
that are gross human rights violators. But asking is not necessarily getting, and putting such
requirements in U.S. statutes does not necessarily mean that the United States complies.
There have been sporadic efforts, particularly in the 1990s, to actually use foreign assistance
to promote human rights compliance. Following revelations in the early 1990s that much of
the U.S. military assistance given to Colombia-ostensibly to control drug trafficking--was
actually being used by the Colombian army to engage in civil war against leftist guerillas
and otherwise engage in gross human rights violations, Congress suspended foreign
assistance to the Colombian army between 1994 and 1997. In 1996, Congress adopted a
provision called the Leahy Amendment, which provides that U.S. security assistance cannot
be given to foreign government divisions that engage in gross human rights violations. The
U.S. entered into negotiations with Colombia and extracted a memorandum of
understanding that Colombia would not use U.S. military assistance to commit fundamental
human rights violations. Provisions such as the Leahy Amendment thus incorporate concern
for human rights into formal U.S. legislative processes, and promote a dialogue with foreign
states on human rights concerns.
Colombia is the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid in the world after Israel and
Egypt. Presently, Congress is negotiating the appropriations package of SI.6 billion to
Colombia, largely for military training and assistance for drug trafficking purposes. We
presently have a number of military advisors there, and Jesse Helms today is holding
hearings in the Senate regarding human rights complicity by the Colombian military which
would not be consistent with the Leahy Amendment.
Two days ago, Human Rights Watch issued one in a series of reports that have
consistently documented that the Colombian military has either itself committed human
rights atrocities or that the army has collaborated with and provided assistance to para-
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military forces that have engaged in a number of documented human rights violations in the
last year. I personally believe that the United States has been part of the civil rights problem
in Latin America in the past, and that efforts such as the Leahy Amendment to try to
incorporate respect for human rights into U.S. foreign assistance policies are very, very
important, particularly if we are going to be providing military assistance in this maimer.
There are tremendous problems involved. It is very, very difficult to monitor whether or not
a country such as Colombia is actually using Blackhawk helicopters for legitimate, rather
than illegitimate, purposes. And when civil war and drug interdiction and authoritarian
military control are all concentrated in the same place, it is almost impossible to separate
them out. But I think the U.S. effort to do so is important.
V.

A.

PANEL THREE: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PAST HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES:
FACING THE LEGACY OF AUTHORITARIANISM
PanelIntroduction by ProfessorSteven Ratner

Welcome to our last panel, which is entitled "Accountability for Past Human Rights
Abuses: Facing the Legacy of Authoritarianism." I am Steve Ratner. I teach public
international law here at the Law School. My areas of interest are principally in the area of
human rights, and I am delighted to be chairing this last panel. Our last panel considers how

to deal with the legacy of the past, an issue which lurks either in the foreground or in the
background of all transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. It is an issue that has

traumatized and plagued almost every emerging democracy in Latin America in that it
involves those who have committed horrible deeds and their victims, as well as society as a
whole and what their reaction is going to be to each of these groups of people.
This, of course, is not just a problem in Latin America, but a problem in emerging
democracies throughout the world. Like my other two University of Texas colleagues, at
least at this conference, I too am not a Latin Americanist, although I follow the region quite
closely. To the extent I have a regional expertise, it lies in some other parts of the world.
Latin America's grappling with the accountability issues has been, perhaps, the most
profound and pronounced because they started grappling with them before most other
countries. That is to say, they started grappling with them in 1983 in Argentina, which is
before almost every other country in the world started dealing with these questions in the
recent state of democratization. Spain and Greece dealt with it a little bit earlier in the
1970s but, for the most part, Argentina was the one that got this whole debate started. And
then, as the other Latin American countries became democracies, these issues became
tremendously important as well.
We are delighted to have two speakers today in addition to me who will be making
presentations on the question of what to do with the abusers of the past and how that relates
to the question of restoration of the rule of law democracy. Our first speaker is Francisco
Cox, who is with Human Rights Watch in New York as a counsel for international justice.
We are delighted to have him here today. Before working for Human Rights Watch, he was
an advisor to the executive director of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, and he
has also written an important book about the protection of human rights in the InterAmerican system. His current work for human rights principally deals with the issue of
universal jurisdiction, that is, the ability of individual states to try human rights abuses that
take place outside their territory, which is of course the issue in the Pinochet case and in
prosecutions that have been attempted in other states. He has followed not only the
Pinochet case, but also the attempt by Senegal to prosecute the former dictator of Chad, and
has been involved in Human Rights Watch's work at galvanizing Senegal's judiciary to
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move forward on that process. So our first speaker is Francisco Cox. We are delighted to
have you here.
B.

Statement ofMr. FranciscoCox

The issue of accountability for past human rights is complex. There are usually
misconceptions about this complexity that I would like to straighten out. One common
misconception is that there are not any rules concerning past human rights violations and
that any country can do whatever they want. That, I would argue, is not true according to an
international law perspective.
International law has evolved and there is an emerging principle that there are at least
four obligations that states have when they are dealing with these issues. One would be
truth, tell the truth, the whole truth, about what happened. That is a right that society and
the victims have. Second, states must prosecute, investigate, and eventually sanction.
Third, states have a duty to repair and compensate the victims for the loss, not only
monetary compensation, but also restitution. And fourth, states must cleanse or purge the
military forces so that these crimes are not committed again.
The natural question that follows is where does this come from? It is a great thing to
have what political scientists call an epistemic community. International organizations like
the Inter-American Commission, the Human Rights Committee, the Security Council, the
Inter-American Court, and the European Court of Human Rights have all said, more or less,
that is what is due to the victims. Special rapporteurs of the United Nations also perform
the same function. I assume that there are a lot of international lawyers or future law yers
who will say, "But some of those are soft laws, it is not hard law."
Our answer is that these are the authoritative organs to interpret the treaties. All the
decisions, at least in the Inter-American system, have been done by the Inter-American
Commission and in some cases ratified by the Inter-American Court. For example, in
Veldsquez Rodriguez, one of the leading cases on this issue, that was exactly what the court
said. Giving money to the victims is not enough. In order to guarantee the full enjoyment
of human rights, the state has a duty to investigate and prosecute systematic and grave
human rights violations.
This would lead me to a second question which I would phrase as "the mind-yourown-business" doctrine, which is regularly the attitude of most states. Why does the
international community even have a right to intervene in this issue? Why do they care?
Obviously, it depends on where you stand. If you look from an international perspective,
then the international community has asserted that there is a right. If you read the Universal
Declaration, the preamble says that acknowledging human rights violations is a threat to
international peace. There is a certain link that the international community has when the
cases or the human rights violations are under the category of crimes against humanity. For
those violations, the international community will have a right to have a statement.
Then there are treaty laws that have expressly addressed these violations. An
extensive part of Latin America has ratified and accepted these obligations. Some examples
are the Torture Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and the Genocide Convention. They
all establish a duty to prosecute. Now, we-and when I say we, I mean the Human Rights
Watch-are frequently labeled as being naive and in a morally distant position, saying,
"You only claim this out of principle and you are not being realistic. What happens when
you cannot do these things?" Our answer to that is that exceptions should be the narrowest
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possible. Usually any state will say, "As soon as we try to prosecute these people, they are
going to go back and take arms against us and there is going to be military coup d'etat."
Obviously, the international community also has an interest that democracies develop,
so it is important to assess which obligations they will fulfill. These four obligations that I
mentioned are distinctive obligations. For example, if you cannot prosecute people because
of factual impediments or legal impediments, then you must still comply with the other
obligations. And in a certain sense, not just because the Argentine crowd is here, I really
think it is the best experience. Carlos Rosenkrantz mentioned that the military had lost the
war and, in a certain way, that is usually the argument that is used to say why it was possible
to prosecute the military. What I always say is do not forget why they went to war. It was
not because they were in a power position to go to war; they were already in a weakened
position. That weakened position had, in certain ways, been moved by civil society and, I
would think by international pressure and several other factors that led them to look for an
instrument to regain popular support, which was the Malvinas War. To clarify, if you
cannot satisfy one obligation, you still have the remaining three. Argentina, I vould say, has
one of the best reparation programs that have been implemented for human rights violations.
They did have the Truth Commission. They did, and this I do not think is repeated often
enough, try the members of the junta. They tried the highest-ranked people involved in
persecution.
Why is it that human rights groups seem obsessed with criminal prosecution? I will
give you our explanation. First, criminal law has a symbolic value that has been attributed
to no other law. That is why most interest groups seek the application of criminal law to
their interest. That is why the environmental movement is calling for the prosecution of
environmental crimes. In society, it has an important value. This symbolic value for society
says that these are principles that you cannot in any way touch; otherwise, you will be
prosecuted. The last resource of the law will be applied, which is criminal law. So we think
human rights are at the basis of society. They are the basic elements of society, and society
must respect them. Allegedly it is why the state has been built: to promote and protect
people. When these rights have been violated, the maximum or the most important legal
instrument that is available should be applied. That is why we believe that criminal law is
important.
The other aspect is that society has taken centuries to find a way to determine
procedural proof. It seems strange, to me at least, that if you steal a car or if you kill one
person, you use criminal systems. If you commit genocide, you go to a truth commission.
To me there is something wrong with that. What is wrong is not only that I am not being
naive and saying, "Well, I understand why, politically, that happens." What I am saying is
some people have converted a necessity into a virtue. If you cannot prosecute, assume it
with dignity and say, "We cannot prosecute. We will tell the truth and we will abide with
our other three obligations, but honestly, we cannot do this." I think that it is a good faith
reaction from a state toward its international obligations, and the international community
should have certain deference to their option.
But, again, why criminal prosecution? It provides a space, a room, an atmosphere, and
a public space to debate these highly controversial issues. What is the main problem with
truth commissions? Maybe with the exception of the South African Truth Commission, it is
that you only have one version of the truth. People that go to truth commissions usually will
be the victims, so it is not really an adversarial process. The people that were involved in
those crimes can always use the excuse, "Well, but that was kind of phony. It was not a real
process there. It was not a judicial process. We know what the rule of law holds and we
know about due process. You have cross-examination, and you bring evidence, and then
you can convict me." That is sort of like a second-best truth. Therefore, it allows people to
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discuss issues that divide a country in a courtroom, in a more civilized way, and in a manner
that would otherwise not be available. From a more political perspective, I think the main
function of criminal prosecution is what we were talking about earlier in the morning.
In Latin America, the military has called upon itself to serve as the guardian of
nationalism or the national identity. If the military think they can get away with these
crimes, and that they had a reason to do them, and if society accepts that reason, then society
is only confirming the military's self-image as protectors of the nation. In confirming the
image, if this happens again, the military must intervene because they have to save the
identity of the nation. Society must send a clear message that this is not the identity of the
nation: From now on, this nation is going to live by the rule of law. Making the most
powerful exempt from the law only confirms images that people already have of massive
impunity and that the justice system works only for a few.
I do not know if you are interested, but usually people are interested in knowing about
the whole Pinochet case and what happened. I would like to use the Pinochet case as a case
study of how many of these arguments that democracy will break down are sometimes
overstated. As you all know, on October 16, 1998, Pinochet was in his bedroom in a
hospital in Great Britain when two British policemen came in and served him with a very
sloppy subpoena. I wish I had a copy with me right now. It was hand-written. International
history changed at this moment, and it was in a hand-written subpoena. I thought it was
inappropriate for the historical moment, but that's the way it happened. After that, Pinochet
disputes his arrest based on the fact that he was a diplomat of the state and he had immunity.
This is when things get interesting. They win the first point and the second high point they
also win. Then we get to the House of Lords, where the House of Lords votes three to two
against Pinochet. I think the best narrative of the whole hearing of the House of Lords is by
an Argentine news reporter who relates it to a soccer game, which I thought was fascinating.
It is a three to two win. The judgment was based primarily on customary international law,

claiming that torture is an international crime, and therefore, if it is an international crime
you cannot claim sovereign immunity. That decision, we all celebrate. I can tell you thatjust like Americans say, "I know what I was doing when Kennedy was shot"--I know what I
was doing when Pinochet lost in the House of Lords.
That was fascinating; all celebrated. Then the judgment was overturned, because one
of the Lords had links with Amnesty International, not Human Rights Watch. Then we go
to a second round, and that decision is highly confusing. A lot of people really did not
understand what came out of it. It is mainly a British legislative decision arguing on the
issue of double criminality, and changing the rule, and arguing that double criminality must
be a crime at the moment of the commission of the crime and not at the moment of the
extradition request, which is usually how the decision is interpreted.
On the issue of sovereign immunity, it is claimed that there is no immunity when all
three parties have become parties to the Torture Convention; therefore, there is no sovereign
immunity because by the Convention's own definition of torture, precedent is included in
the act of the criminal torture.
This is happening in London. Chile, as claimed by the president and by government
officials, was completely reconciled. It was the happiest story of how to deal with human
rights violations in history. However, when Pinochet was arrested, the mayor of the city
where the embassies of Spain and Great Britain are situated refused to take out the trash of
those embassies because they "kidnapped our general." Half of the country goes against
Pinochet and half are in favor of Pinochet. You have the most fascinating revival of all the
cases that were completely forgotten in the courts of the Chilean system. You have to
understand that the Chilean government went for all possible explanations to bring Pinochet
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back-that he was a diplomat and he had immunity-but they forgot to get the proper
authorization by the foreign ministry in Great Britain, so his diplomatic passport was
useless. They were not defending immunity actually; they were defending the territorial
principle ofjurisdiction. They used every possible explanation to bring him back. But their
last resort was, "we can do it. Give him back to us and we will do it. We had ten years to
do it and we did not, but forget about that; we will do it now."
Because of that, all these cases started to move forward. One Spanish judge, Guzmin,
who, under a kind of legal fiction, but which is accurate in legal terms internally, used the
theory that a kidnap is equivalent to a disappearance and therefore is a continuous crime.
Until the body is produced or there is certainty when the murder was committed, then the
crime is still being committed. Therefore, the Amnesty Law of 1978 is not usefil and all
these years are under the jurisdiction of the courts. So they open the court and the military
is indicted and everything is a completely new country. Afterwards, Pinochet will be
claimed to be senile. But what is most interesting is that the military, though they stomped,
were angry, and protested like crazy, did not have a military coup d'etat. Democracy was
not jeopardized at all.
All the issues are what I would call the "owner of the soccer ball" syndrome, which is
where you are playing in the neighborhood against the kid that owns the ball and you score
against him. He gets so angry that he grabs the ball and leaves, and the game is over, That
is what I think was behind the mind of most politicians in Chile. The ball of our democracy
is really that our governance is the ball of the military. We are only playing as long as they
let us play. So let's not score against them, because if we do, they are going to get mad and
take the ball away. With Guzmdn, maybe one explanation is that he took the ball away.
The important thing is that democracy was not in any way compromised during this process.
The democratic system, I would say, is better suited now to deal with human rights
violations of the past. They even created a dialogue table where, for the first time, the
military is hearing what the human rights lawyers have to say about what happened in this
country.
So I think the role that the international community can play to motivate the internal
process of countries addressing past human rights violations is an important one that should
not be diminished because of issues of sovereignty or claims that it's First World against
Third World. With this I finish, because this concept of universal jurisdiction is expanding.
For example, there is the case of Chad, where Senegal, an African country, is prosecuting a
dictator from Chad, another African country, which is Third World to Third World, trying
to assert an international rule of law.
C.

Statement ofProfessorRoberto Saba

Our fragile democracy has suffered several attacks since 1930 and was interrupted half
a dozen times by coup d'etats. All those unconstitutional governments established
dictatorial regimes. The last one was the most violent and bloodiest of all of them. I will
refer to the human rights violations perpetrated in Argentina between 1976 and 1983 by this
military government and the way in which my country, its democratic governments elected
since the end of the dictatorship, and its people have dealt with that violence. Many authors,
activists, and victims have thought, written, and expressed their views about this issue
already and I wondered how my presentation could make a contribution to this ongoing
conversation. I believe that an interesting way of revisiting this issue and jumping into the
discussion would be by looking to its connection with the future of democratic institutions,
the rule of law, and human rights in Argentina. Argentina has recovered its democratic
regime, at least its formal and basic institutions, but it does not mean that it has been able to
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construct the rule of law-the sense that under democracy the law is to be applied to
everybody, without exceptions-and a solid and strong culture of human rights. Therefore,
I will reexamine what happened after the dictatorship both in government and within civil
society having in the back of my mind the question of whether what we did and the way we
did it contributed or not to the consolidation of the democratic system and to the
construction of the rule of law in Argentina. I would also like, at the end of my

presentation, to refer to what could be foreseen for the near future in this respect.
Between 1976 and 1983 a violent dictatorship was established in Argentina. A
military dictatorship that caused, among other terrible effects, the death or, euphemistically
speaking, the "disappearance," of, at least, ten thousand people.' It was the most horrible
time of my nation's history. Unfortunately, this unprecedented fact in my country was not,
however, unique in the modem world. The collective violence that Argentineans suffered
during those years was not at all too different from what peoples from other nations had to
face in the second half of the Twentieth Century. I am thinking of countries like El
Salvador, Guatemala, South Afica, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and most countries of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union. The democratic governments that took office after
those violent regimes left power were compelled to make decisions about how to deal with
past atrocious deeds. All these nations had to make very hard choices. These choices were
basically related to the possibility and the tensions of pursuing two fundamental values that
were at stake: justice, on the one hand, and the consolidation of democracy, on the other.
Additionally, the claim for justice was not clear at all. The pursuit ofjustice means so many
different things for all the actors involved. Did justice mean punishing those responsible for
human rights violations? Did it mean punishing all of them or just those at the top of the
military organization? Did it mean just punishing or did it imply also the uncovering of the
truth of what really happened? Is it possible to pursue justice only by seeking the truth,
without punishing? Punishment and truth. Truth without punishment. Punishment without
all the truth. These were and usually are the basic dilemmas of those agreeing on the basic
value ofjustice.
Whatever we understand by "justice," it was, together with the founding and
consolidation of a democratic regime, one of the two values competing in the minds of those
who made decisions regarding what should be done about the past in the countries I
mentioned before. The Argentinean case is a clear example of a strategy that pursued the
seeking of the truth and aspired to make responsible for their crimes those who committed
them. This enterprise of bringing justice and truth always entails risks as well as positive
effects. The risk is the destabilization of the democratic regime. Its major contribution is
related to the possibility of building the rule of lav, which is usually destroyed by
dictatorship. The trials that vere held to prosecute and convict human rights perpetrators
sought this goal. If we wanted to find a new democratic regime, a democracy that were
strong and built on solid foundations, we, as a people, had to make it very clear that no one
who overthrew a democratic government, killed, and tortured her fellow citizens would go
away without consequences. It must be made clear that the "law," as the expression of
people's will, is the same for everyone and no one should never consider herself above it
never again.
The decision of trying those responsible for human rights violations had, of course,
many supporters and critics. For some, the enterprise of building a democratic regime after
a long period in which dictators ruled requires huge amounts of political and moral capital
that should not be wasted-they argue-in investigating and prosecuting crimes committed
I. The CONADEP, the commission created by the democratic government for invesugating the crims
perpetrated during the dictatorship, found proofs of almost 10,000 disappearances. It is balieved, however, that
actually around 30,000 people disappeared.
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in the past. Investing in prosecuting people for past human rights violations is not the best
way to "invest" that capital. People with this kind of opinion are very critical, of course, of
what happened in Argentina. They contend that the Argentinean government wasted a lot of
its political capital in prosecuting people for past deeds instead of establishing a strong
democratic regime. I believe, however, that trying past human rights violations could be
part of a serious and effective strategy for re-founding a democratic regime. I do not see
why looking to the past should be an obstacle for constructing the future. I do see how the
hiding of the past could become an obstacle for having a future.
At least two elements are basic for the proper functioning of the rule of law-equal
application of the law and the establishment of an independent judiciary that applies it. In
this sense, making justice is a way of contributing to the building of the rule of law. Far
from being a threat to the project of building the rule of law and the democratic system, it is
a way of strengthening this project. By trying the military, for the first time in many years,
the message that was delivered to society was that the law was the same for everybody. The
trials were a way of communicating that nobody, from that moment on, even those who were
in government or in power, were above or outside the law.
In 1993, when Alfonsin was running for the presidency, one of the central ideas of his
electoral discourse-and one reason why many people voted for him-was related to his
project of constructing, from that moment on, a democratic nation. After seven years of
lawlessness, the proposal of reconstructing the rule of law was extremely appealing and
supported by the citizenry. His victory in the presidential election, I believe, could be
regarded as the expression of the people's will to recreate its democratic institutions and
reestablish the rule of law. Alfonsin and his administration felt and were responsible for
this mission as soon as they took office and many of their initial decisions went in this
direction:
First, the nullification of the self-amnesty law: If the goal was the reestablishment of
the rule of law, the self-amnesty law that was passed by the military government a few days
before leaving office was the first obstacle to be overcome by the new democratic
government. This law meant that those who committed crimes were protecting themselves
from being tried and from eventually being punished for their deeds. It was not, however,
an easy case. It would not have been effective to derogate this law because our Criminal
Code guarantees defendants the benefit of the most favorable law existing from the time of
the crime to the sentencing, and this rule cannot be abrogated without violating the due
process clause established in the Constitution that proscribes retroactive penal legislation.
Some people argued that applying this law was a way of eroding the rule of law. Validity of
the law, they argued, is an evaluative concept integrally linked to morality. Instead, others
said that not applying this law had the effect of undermining the ideal of the rule of law.
How could it be stated that the law must be followed by everyone and, at the same time,
proposed not to apply this specific law? The government decided that this piece of
legislation could not be considered "law" and it was not derogated but taken as if it was
never enacted. The lack of its moral foundations was the reason that justified its
nullification. After all, it was the military men, the same people who were its beneficiaries,
who made the decision. A decision made by the government is considered to be "law" not
only because it may be called "law," but also because it is the expression of the will of the
people reached after a democratic process of deliberation. Of course, if any law that does
not like the government or the judge is considered as if it were never passed, there is no rule
of law in place. But this was not the case of this first move of the newly elected democratic
government. It all depends on whether rule of law means the rule of "any" lav or whether
only certain decisions can be considered to have the legal authority to be "law." I think that
in order to determine what the rule of law is, we should not pay attention only to the
following of certain formalities in the process of making the decision. I think it was
Professor Perry, as well as Lourdes Flores Nano, who mentioned that in our countries we
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have lots of laws but we do not have, I may add, a working rule of law. By following what
is supposed to be the law, what is decided by the government no matter how or what is
decided, we can destroy our legal system, our democracy, and our rule of law. I suggest
here a little digression and I propose for you to think a bit over about what the rule of law is.
I definitely do not think that the law that should rule is just the one that reflects the decisions
that were formally enacted by Congress or, in this case, made by the military government.
There is something else that must be considered as a fundamental element of the rule of law
if we are willing to establish and protect it. The rule of law is not just any set of rules, but a
set of rules that are justified by constitutional principles that assume the ideal of human
rights. Not just any governmental decision that has some "color" of law can be called
"law." In this sense, there is no attack on the rule of law when you disregard the selfamnesty law. Indeed, it is actually a contribution to its development and strengthening.
Nullification of the amnesty law in Argentina was the first sign that the project of
establishing the rule of law was a serious one. Thanks to the decision of "nullifying" the
self-amnesty law and considering it as if it was never passed, it was possible to prosecute the
perpetrators and to deliver the message that they would not be able to go around the law by
putting themselves above it.
The second move in the direction of building the rule of law in Argentina after 1983
was the decision of bringing those responsible for human rights violations before the judges.
Bringing to court those who were in the former government and who were still powerful was
an astonishing and courageous decision. Of course, the defeat of our military forces in the
Malvinas/Falklands Islands against the British was crucial in the process of eroding the
dictatorship's political power and popular support-if any was left at that moment-and that
created the conditions to make this decision with some level of certainty about the fact that
nothing terribly bad could happen. But the military was not so completely weak when the
trials began, however, as to make any chance of risk the democratic regime completely
remote. Indeed, they attempted to overthrow the government on several occasions. Despite
these threats to the system, the decision to hold the trials and to apply the law to all of those
involved in crimes was sustained.
Unfortunately, this great beginning did not last long. The project of establishing the
rule of law began to be eroded when the government felt that its stability and the stability of
the regime itself were at stake. Three decisions contributed to the undermining of the
project, two under Alfonsin's presidency and the third one made by President Menem. I am
referring to, firstly, the decision that limited the number of members of the military who
were going to be tried, known as the Due Obedience Law. Secondly, there was the attempt
to limit the number of cases that were going to be brought to court, known as the FinalStop
Law. And finally, of course, there was President Menem's decision to pardon those few
who were already convicted during Alfonsin's tenure.
The outcome of this process that began in 1983 was not completely positive for the
project of constructing the rule of law that Alfonsin and the people in his administration
seemed so committed to after the dictatorship. The original program of establishing and
strengthening the new democratic regime and the rule of law was finally interrupted. I
would not say, however, that this program was fully aborted. I would not say either that this
project, so strongly supported at the beginning of the 1980s, was a complete failure. I do
not say that. I would say that it was just very much eroded. This ideal of not allowing
anyone to be above or outside the law was not fulfilled in the 1990s. All those who
committed horrible crimes protected by the fact of being illegally in power are today
walking the streets of Argentina's cities without being reached by the legal consequences of
violating the law. There are good reasons to believe that, once again, in Argentina we are
not equal. That the law is not applied equally to all citizens no matter who they are.

TExAs INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 36:319

I believe, however, that besides what the government could have achieved in this
process, there were developments somewhere else that brought and bring hope for the
democratic future of Argentina. If we focus only on the story I presented, it is clear that our
weak democratic system was not strengthened to the levels many of us dreamt twenty years
ago. But the recent history of Argentina was not made only out of government decisions. I
would like to finish, therefore, with an optimistic message. Although I believe that in some
way the project of establishing the rule of law declined and weakened at the end of the
1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, I do think that other things happened in Argentina's
civil society even before 1983 that were extremely important for the strengthening of the
democratic system and the rule of law. During the dictatorship, in the beginning of the
1980s, some brave people began a movement that was crucial for the future of our
democracy. I am referring to what human rights organizations and activists did and, I would
dare to say, what they did almost without being completely aware of what they were doing.
They brought, through their efforts of making human rights respected by governments and
citizens, a missing element in Argentina's democracy-its constitutional element. In
Argentina as well as in some other countries, as we heard this morning, the idea of
democracy fits right in between populism-understood as pure majoritarianism-and
fundamentalism. The first one overemphazises the role of majorities in the democratic
game, overlooking the constitutional limit to what majorities can do. This idea of having a
democratic regime without or with a very weak limit imposed by the constitution caused
extremely serious problems for Argentina that we are still paying for. The latter, that
fundamentalism is usually represented by bloody dictatorships, implies the complete
underestimation of what the constitutional limit and the majority rule mean in a
constitutional democratic regime. In Argentina, we have never had a constitutional
democracy in the sense that the majority rules with the limit established by the fact of
having a constitution and constitutional rights. I think it is very interesting to see how the
work of human rights organizations, by emphasizing this "human rights element" so usually
overlooked in our democracies, brought the constitutional element that was missing in our
constitutional democracy. Later in the 1990s, the work of human rights organizations was
complemented by the initiatives of a new and different kind of organization that appeared on
the scene-citizens' organizations devoted to promoting citizen participation and building
democratic institutions. These organizations focused, once again, on building the rule of
law, on having institutions that could be used by citizens to enforce the laws, and ol
bringing again the picture this constitutional or public dimension that was missing in our
democracy. It is interesting, as Francisco Cox said before, that the work of human rights
organizations centered largely on lawsuits against the state claiming for justice, Time and
change in the historical and political context made human rights organizations shift to
different but not contradictory goals. These changes also made citizens' organizations
emerge. All of them are now directing their attention to the building of democratic
institutions, to the control of the government and the police, and, as Professor Perry was
saying this morning, to building institutions that are basic, such as freedom of speech and
freedom of association.
All these constitutional elements introduced by the work of human rights and citizens'
organizations lead to the recognition of a countermajoritarian element that implies the ideal
of human rights, that is non-negotiable, and that is one of the most positive outcomes that
was achieved despite the not-so-positive or the negative outcomes that came out of the
government's strategies to deal with the past.
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Statement of ProfessorSteven Rather

I would just like to make some remarks putting into perspective or a framework the
comments made by the two previous speakers about the experiences in Chile and Argentina.
The framework that I am going to put it into is that of international law, which Francisco
Cox alluded to at several points in his talk. I think it is an important way of trying to
analyze this problem.
As I indicated in my opening remarks, these fragile democracies in the Americas are
part of a larger group of countries around the world that we might call transitional states or
transitional regimes that are moving from autocracy to democracy. They range from states
that we still might regard as somewhat authoritarian, like Indonesia or Cambodia, to
countries like South Africa or Rvanda or those in Central America. In the process,
probably a very long process, of moving away from authoritarianism, they want to put the
past behind them. But the most severe form of doing that-impunity and forgetting about
the past entirely-raises its own set of problems. In these countries, the human rights
violators are often in their midst, although they may have different degrees of power, as we
have just seen in the two cases we just talked about. And, of course, the rule of law is not
yet in place.
What international law has had to say about these developments has developed over
the course of the last ten or twenty years through emerging and maybe even emergent
distinct sets of norms. One is what I call a duty of democracy, and one is what I call a duty
of accountability. A duty of democracy is the idea that states have the obligation to have a
specific form of government based on the consent of the governed through free and fair
elections and a rule of law to protect those not in the majority. That is liberal democracy,
which is not just a western idea anymore. It is something that is clearly seen in the
documents of the Organization of American States. It is clearly seen in the documents of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which includes Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union. It is even seen in documents of the United Nations now, and
in the way the United Nations reacts to interruptions in the democratic processes in many
different countries.
I probably would not go so far as to say that this is totally emergent and a solid form of
customary law, but it is clear that there are many trends in that direction from international
law regarding the single acceptable form of government. International law does not seem to
be requiring authoritarian states to become democratic, but it certainly reacts in a certain
way when a democratic transition is interrupted by a return to authoritarianism, as seen by
UN General Assembly resolutions about Haiti, Burma, or even Nigeria.
Now, a duty of accountability is somewhat different. It is the one that Francisco Cox
was talking about. The duty of accountability is the idea that individuals should be held
personally responsible for human rights abuses. What do I mean by personally responsible
and what do I mean by international law? Well, there are in fact, as he pointed out, treaties
that require states to prosecute certain types of crimes. The Genocide Convention, the
Geneva Conventions, the Convention on Torture, and the Convention on Disappearances,
which is a Latin American convention, all require states to prosecute human rights abuses or
extradite them to a state that will.
Beyond these treaties, certain bodies that have interpreted human rights instruments,
such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, and the UN Human Rights Committee, have interpreted other human rights
instruments to have even broader duties of accountability to cover crimes that are not
mentioned in these treaties, as well as saying that states have a duty to prosecute all serious
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abuses of human rights. These comments by these treaty interpretation bodies are quite
significant. The problem is that they continue to be ignored by many states. In fact, most
states in these situations continue to pass amnesties, and I can give you a whole list of them
throughout the globe-states that have either honored past amnesties and have not
overturned them, that have passed their own amnesties, or that have engaged in the basically
de facto amnesty policy by not prosecuting.
Although I believe that there is some duty of criminal accountability that is emerging, I
do not think that it is solidified in custom, if we talk about custom as being what states do
and what states believe. There are, however, some trends toward lesser, non-criminal duties
of accountability, like the idea of states having to sanction people or to bring out the truth,
which seems to be accepted by more and more states.
Now why are these two norms important for these transitional states in Latin America,
these fragile democracies? Well, because at least on one glance, one of them is oriented
toward the future, the kind of government you are supposed to have in the future, and one of
them is oriented toward the past, about what you are supposed to do with the past. Now that
is, of course, a superficial analysis, but that is a view that has been accepted by many
governments in these transitional democracies, not the least of which are those in Latin
America. In fact, many elites in these countries believe these norms as suggesting opposite
courses of action for the country in terms of what they should do. Democracy pulls them in
one direction, but accountability pulls them in another.
What I want to do is just briefly talk about how the governments and NGOs in Latin
America and other states have talked about these two duties and how they have tried to
reconcile them and how we might try to reconcile them. The way I like to look at this
problem is that there are really two sets of normative connections between the emerging
duty under international law of accountability and an emerging duty under international law
of democracy. These groupings are basically groupings that I get from looking at the
statements that are actually made by governments and NGOs about these duties. I group
and arguments of priority. I have written about
them into what I call arguments of causation
2
this in an article that came out last year.
But basically, what is the argument of causation? The question of causation is: what is
the causal relationship between accountability and democracy? Essentially, this question
centers on whether or not retrospective accountability, that is, accountability for abuses of
the past, is going to promote democracy or is going to undermine democracy. And that is,
of course, what has been central to the discussion of the previous two speakers.
Francisco Cox gave as eloquent an explanation as there is from the NGO perspective.
Some international organizations will say that it is not simply causally related, but that it is
in fact necessary to have retrospective accountability-to hold criminal trials of past
abusers-in order to build democracy: it builds respect for the rule of law; it removes these
people from the midst of society; it is the only remedy that satisfies the victims; and it shows
that equal justice has been restored. Only trials can really do that.
The problem is that governments around the world in many cases are saying no-that
not only is accountability not necessary to promote democracy, but that accountability is in
fact an affirmative obstacle to it. They cite a variety of reasons about why accountability is
an affirmative obstacle to democracy. They typically talk about national reconciliation and
how accountability, and specifically criminal accountability through trials, is going to
somehow undermine national reconciliation, and it is therefore something that should be
deferred or perhaps basically forgotten about. How does this manifest itself7

2. Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry on InternationalLaw, 87 GEo. L.J. 707
(1999).
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It manifests itself in the amnesty we see in peace agreements. For example, the
notorious amnesty in the Sierra Leone peace agreement from last year provided an amnesty
to the butchers in the resistance movement who chopped off the arms and legs of innocent
people, and the United Nations, of course, initialed the agreement. It has also happened in a
legislatively passed amnesty, like that in El Salvador and Guatemala. As I indicated before,
it has happened de facto. The United Nations has rarely objected to these amnesties. Most
countries have been completely silent about them. The United States is the rare example
that has criticized the amnesty in Guatemala and the amnesty in a few other countries. The
governments and the states in the international community are mostly deferring to these
countries and are basically content that the bad guys are gone. So we have this basic
disagreement between the two sides about the relationship between the two norms.
Now there may be some issues where the two sides agree. They probably both agree
that accountability that does not respect the rights of defendants is a bad thing. In other
words, that would be something where the NGOs would agree that that sort of
accountability is bad, and there have been examples of accountability processes that have
ignored the rights of targets. The anti-accountability forces might agree that there are some
situations where accountability is important to get somebody literally off the political scene
because they will not otherwise leave. A criminal trial may be the only way to get rid of
someone like Radovan Karadzic,who still wields power in Bosnia behind the scenes.
But there is, I think, a general lack of consensus among states about the causal
question. And the result of that is that as we see democracy becoming more and more
accepted, it is not likely to spill over into a belief that accountability is a good idea. In other
words, if there is no consensus on the causal link, then a greater acceptance of a norm of
democracy is not likely to lead to a greater acceptance of a norm of accountability. We
could see a lot more democracies and yet see outside states being completely deferential and
silent if those new democracies pass more and more amnesties. I, of course, am arguing this
not as an advocate for one side or the other, but as my sense of how I look at state practice
on this question.
Now we turn to the question about arguments of priority. What are the arguments
about priority? There are two arguments of priority that are essentially made by the NGOs.
One, the extreme form, might be that accountability is the most important value because of
the justice it brings for the victims. The more common argument is that accountability is a
duty on states, similar to the argument that Francisco Cox made, that cannot be sacrificed

for the sake of democracy or for the sake of building democratic institutions. One sees this
in the statements of treaty bodies like the Inter-American Commission, which have heard
arguments from Argentina and Uruguay claiming that they could not prosecute because it
would undermine democracy. The treaty bodies say, "We just do not buy that. We have
interpreted the treaties to say you must have trials, or at least you cannot have amnesties,
and we do not buy the argument that trials will undermine democracy anymore, and it is a
legal obligation." That is the argument from one side.
The other argument is that democracy is the most important value. Its extreme form,
or one extreme form, is basically that willful amnesia is just fine. That has certainly been
the reaction of Spain since the return of democracy there in 1976. The problem, or one of
many problems, with this argument is that it is only one step away from saying, "Why
should we even bother with accountability for ongoing abuses or future abuses?" If we just
want to build up institutions based on rule of the majority, you can ask why we should
prosecute this policeman who just committed a violation in a post-transitional environment.
It is a very dangerous argument, but it is, nevertheless, one that is being made. I certainly
saw the argument being made in the Cambodia context. Frankly, I saw how the extreme
version could be detrimental to human rights today.
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These are sort of contrary deontological positions. It is somewhat hard to find some
common ground between them. One way that one might find common ground is to let the
voters decide. In other words, let us have a democratic process to decide about
accountability. That is the Uruguayan solution, and the Uruguayan solution was to grant
amnesty. Uruguay defends that as perfectly legitimate, because it was based upon a vote of
the population. There is some hint of that in the South African Constitutional Court case
about their truth commission; that because their decision to provide a possible amnesty for
those who testify in front of the truth commission was done through a process involving
Mandela and all sorts of democratic groups, it really is not one that should be questioned.
There has been that attempt to find sort of a common ground, but returning to how I
view the practice of states, I think that today democracy is accepted and has achieved a
greater degree of consensus than accountability. The international community is willing to
tolerate decisions that sacrifice accountability. I think it is obviously much better than it
used to be, certainly far better than even ten years ago, but it is still regarded as a domestic
issue. We are likely to hear countries protesting the way government treats its minorities or
the way it treats political opponents more than we are likely to hear protest about the way a
government is dealing with its past. There we are likely to see far more deference.
What NGOs and international organizations have done in response to the rejection of
their deontological argument by states is to turn back to the causation argument. What they
will say is that you may think democracy is more important but, even if you believe that, we
can show you that accountability in fact furthers democracy, so we can agree on that. But it
is very hard for them in a case like South Africa or Uruguay, where the amnesties have been
adopted democratically. They are basically arguing that a democratic vote to promote an
amnesty does not promote democracy and that the people of a democracy do not know what
is in their own best interest to promote democracy, and that is a hard argument to make. It
is not an impossible argument to make, but it is a hard argument to make because it makes it
seem like the international organizations or the NGOs are standing on some pedestal and
know better than the people of these countries what to do about their past.
Is there any way out of this thicket, if indeed you believe my argument that it is a
thicket to begin with? I do think there is, and I think there are ways we can find common
ground between both sides and try to build democracies and accountability together without
their competing with each other. I would just return to the point that Francisco Cox made
about the need to emphasize the duty of these treaties. There are treaties that clearly require
prosecution of crimes such as torture, disappearances, genocide, and war crimes. If we can
convince states to comply with their treaties instead of having a more vague notion about
human rights compliance, we can focus on the treaties they have actually signed and
embarrass them into complying with those. I think that is a way forward. Of course, one of
the very successful strategies of an organization like Human Rights Watch is to get countries
to obey their own treaties. I would also emphasize that these softer, non-criminal dutiesduties that do not require trying everybody for human rights abuses, or even all the
significant abuses-can also be emphasized to governments in transition.
I think we can have more modest steps. One of them would be that states should be
discouraged, or indeed prohibited, from the idea of self-amnesties. That is one that both our
previous speakers talked about. It violates the maxim of common and civil law about being
a judge in your own case. Clearly, I think that is something we can get both sides to agree
on-self-amnesties ought to be disallowed. In addition, I think there will probably be more
of a consensus on the idea of no blanket amnesties. There is a strong normative support
against blanket amnesties. The treaty bodies, like the Inter-American Commission,
complained principally about blanket amnesties and have been more tolerant of selective
amnesties, or at least they have not yet struck down a selective amnesty. They basically
made their complaints against blanket amnesties.
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If we are going to prosecute, it is more realistic to have a strategy that focuses on those
in the positions of responsibility-the senior people or those responsible for the worst level
of atrocities-rather than to have an overly ambitious agenda that gets too far down in the
chain where states will feel, correctly or incorrectly, that this is sacrificing democracy for
accountability. Beyond this softer version of criminal accountability, I would also
emphasize that those of us who care about human rights can also insist on the non-criminal
forms as being important and again, do it in a way that is regarded by states as less
threatening. States are, in fact, much closer to accepting a duty of non-criminal
accountability than they are to accepting a duty of criminal accountability. What is at the
core of non-criminal accountability? Philosophers and others have said it more eloquently
than I, but basically there must be three ingredients: knowledge, acknowledgement, and
sanction. Thomas Nagel made the comment that knowledge and acknowledgement are the
key. I would add the idea of sanctions as well. The South African model is a key in this
respect. It is one that has come up after many of the Latin American transitions, but we do
see it a little bit in the idea of the truth commission process in El Salvador and in Argentina
and somewhat less successfully in the lustration processes in Czechoslovakia.
I would just end by saying that, for me, the non-criminal form of accountability may be
the only solution in the rare situation where the two norms really do collide. That is a
situation where an autocrat, or an authoritarian regime, really will not give up power, or the
two sides in a civil suit will not settle, except in exchange for amnesty.
What both our speakers have pointed out is that a lot of states claim this is the case,
when in fact it is really not and is simply used as an excuse for amnesties. But what if it is
true that you could not have a peaceful settlement without an amnesty? Arguably, that was
the South African case, where the whites insisted upon some sort of amnesty or some sort of
process of amnesty in order to allow for the transition to the rule of the ANC. In those sorts
of situations, I think that the non-criminal outcome is one that we have to acknowledge and
tacitly accept. International lawyers, many of whom are judicial romantics and see courts as
the only way for implementing the law, will have problems with this, and I am not saying
international law should affirmatively endorse this. Maybe it is just a question of quietly
allowing for it rather than protesting against it. My concern is that if human rights lawyers
continue to see courts and criminal trials as the best solution everywhere, then they may
scare away those allies that they have in transitional governments who also believe that
democracy is important
E.

ConcludingRemarks by Vice Provost Gerald Torres

I would like to thank the Law School and the Institute of Latin American Studies for
helping fund this symposium on fragile democracies. I would like to thank all of the
speakers who worked hard to get here and who traveled a long distance and shared their
thoughtful comments with us.
David Hume said in a letter to Andrew Millar that modem history began when
Columbus disembarked from his ships on his return from the Americas. I think the
estimation is probably true. The democratic experiments we are seeing evolve in Latin
America are the continuation of the history that began with the European encounter with the
Americas. I think that one of the things that emerged from this discussion for me was the
fact that we are witnessing an impressive variety of experiments in democracy. These
experiments are going to be useful and not just for the Americas, although the Americas and
especially Latin America are critically important not just for the Western Hemisphere, but
for the entire globe. Remember that we have an entire continent south of us that is Latin and
a third of North America is also Latin.
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The chapters that are being written in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Peru,
Venezuela, and Mexico reflect an important set of experiments. This is why I think today's
discussion was extremely helpful. The last question concerning the role of indigenous
peoples was critically important to understanding the nature of the democratic experiments
in Latin America. What we are seeing in the Western Hemisphere is that democracy and the
emerging variations of liberal democracy are, in many ways, a continuing confrontation with
the consequences of colonialism. (This is true even in the United States.) So the manner in
which democratic responses to colonialism emerge in the Western Hemisphere will mean
that there will be additional niodels for dealing with colonialism across the globe. Thus
Latin America plays a critically important position, not just because of the population base
that it encompasses, but because of the deeply important conceptual problems that it is
wrestling with in the lives of real people and real peoples.
I want to thank you all for working so hard. This has been an important day.

